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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... ."1 The
privilege prohibits the government from requiring a person to testify if
the declarant's statement may be incriminating in any subsequent
criminal prosecution.2 In addition to requesting testimony, prosecu-
tors frequently demand that individuals and business organizations
produce records and other types of physical evidence. 3 The Fifth
Amendment does not protect the contents of records the author cre-
ated voluntarily.4 Compelling an individual to turn over papers is tes-
timonial, however, and the Fifth Amendment may prohibit the
government from requiring a response if the communicative act in-
criminates the declarant.5
An organization, unlike an individual, has no privilege under the
Fifth Amendment to refuse to produce documents even if production
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966)("[T]he privilege protects an
accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature .... ."); Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)(explaining that the privilege
against self-incrimination "reflects many of our fundamental values and most no-
ble aspirations: [and] our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accu-
satorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice"); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563-64 (1892)(clarifying that the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege applies "in any proceeding" in which compelled testimony may be
incriminating).
3. See, e.g., FED. R. CRI. P. 17(c) ("A subpoena may also command the person to
whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects des-
ignated therein."); WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRnMNAL PROCEDURE,
§ 8.3(c) (2d ed. 1992)("With a subpoena duces tecum, the party served may be
required to undertake the extensive task of bringing together records from sev-
eral different locations and sorting through them to collect those covered by the
subpoena.").
4. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976)("It is also clear that the
Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of
every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is com-
pelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.").
5. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984)("The act of producing the doc-
uments at issue in this case is privileged and cannot be compelled without a stat-
utory grant of use immunity."); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410
(1976)( The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has




would incriminate the organization. 6 Because an organization acts
only through its members, the Supreme Court has held that represen-
tative members are not entitled to the same protection afforded indi-
viduals from producing their own personal documents. 7  An
organization's representative subpoenaed to produce business records
may not assert the privilege to avoid being incriminated by the act of
production. Otherwise, according to the Court, the government's "re-
served power of visitation would seriously be embarrassed, if not
wholly defeated in its effective exercise, if guilty officers could refuse
inspection of the records and papers of the corporation."S An organi-
zation, nominally represented by the custodian who actually complies
with the government's demand, may be compelled to produce docu-
ments regardless of how personally incriminating that act may be to
the custodian appearing on its behalf. Moreover, the government's au-
thority to compel production is not affected by its interest in bringing
charges at some later time against that custodian as an individual.9
Once the government compels a custodian to produce the docu-
ments, the question arises whether the prosecution can require the
representative to provide additional information regarding the records
that can be used in a later proceeding against that witness on the
ground that the custodian has no Fifth Amendment privilege. Any
attempt by the government to compel a defendant to furnish incrimi-
nating testimony, such as authentication of evidence, appears to con-
tradict the language of the Fifth Amendment which prohibits the
government from forcing a person "to be a witness against himself."1o
Despite the apparent protection provided by the Fifth Amendment
privilege, lower courts have held that an individual acting as a custo-
dian of records can be required, qua custodian, to testify about docu-
ments produced in response to the government's demand. Although
the witness usually appears before a grand jury and testifies only in
the capacity of a custodian of records representing a corporate body,
6. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906)(corporation "has no right to refuse to
submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State").
7. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1988)("[W]ithout regard to
whether the subpoena is addressed to the corporation, or as here, to the individ-
ual in his capacity as a custodian,... a corporate custodian such as petitioner
may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment
grounds.")(citations omitted).
8. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911).
9. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988)("[Wle have long recognized
that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and other collective enti-
ties are treated differently from individuals."); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 384-85 (1911)(custodian of corporate records must produce documents even
when custodian created documents and they incriminate the custodian
personally).
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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that testimony can provide the basis for the government to introduce
the records into evidence against that person individually at trial.ii
The two-prong rationale for compelling the custodian's testimony
beyond the production of records is, first, that the statements are only
"auxiliary" to the production of the records;1 2 and, second, that the
Fifth Amendment protection does not apply to corporations called
upon to furnish documents.1 3 If a court can compel a records custo-
dian to give oral testimony in a pretrial proceeding merely because
that person acts on behalf of a corporation, then it is just a short step
to have the government call the defendant to testify at trial, not in a
personal capacity, but solely as the custodian of records. If that were
to happen, then the primary protection afforded by the privilege
against self-incrimination, that the government cannot require a de-
fendant to testify at his own trial, will be undermined.i 4
11. See United States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1995)(recipient of
summons to produce tax records can be compelled to testify before the Internal
Revenue Service "for the limited purpose of identifying the records sought by the
IRS"); United States v. Medlin, 986 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1993) (custodian of
corporate records "will be called on merely to identify and authenticate the docu-
ments he is required to produce .... Such testimony merely makes explicit what
is already implicit in complying with the [IRS] summons.")(citations omitted);
United States v. Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. (In re Custodian of Records of Vari-
ety Distrib., Inc.), 927 F.2d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1991)(enforcing trial subpoena on
ground that "[b]ecause a custodian of corporate records has no necessary relation
to the contents of the documents which he has produced, we do not believe that
statements that he is familiar with the company's recordkeeping practices and
knows that the company regularly keeps such records in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity is sufficiently incriminating in and of itself); United
States v. Raniere, 895 F. Supp. 699, 707 (D.N.J. 1995)(custodian of corporate
records "must also provide authentication testimony as to those documents"
sought by IRS).
12. See United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir.
1929)("M[T]estimony auxiliary to the production [of records] is as unprivileged as
are the documents themselves.").
13. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906).
14. In Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893), the Supreme Court described elo-
quently the rationale for granting a defendant the right not to testify:
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand
though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity,
nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions
of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him, will often
confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than
remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however honest, who
would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand.
Id. at 66. To further protect the Fifth Amendment privilege at trial, the Court
strictly forbids prosecutors from commenting on the defendant's failure to testify.
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); cf Akhil Reed Amar & Ren~e
B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93
MICH. L. REv. 857, 858 (1995)(arguing that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion should be read to prevent a defendant's compelled pretrial statements from
1998]
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While this possibility may appear farfetched, the Supreme Court's
reasoning for denying the privilege against self-incrimination to orga-
nizations could be manipulated to support the prosecution calling a
defendant to testify in its case-in-chief. The Court has never consid-
ered fully the protection of the Fifth Amendment for a custodian of
records compelled to provide information and then prosecuted individ-
ually. The analysis that supports compelling a custodian to testify
about documents at a preliminary proceeding hinges on the erroneous
assumption that the government's power to compel production of
records and related testimony is coextensive during both the investi-
gation and the prosecution of a crime. That assumption can be traced
to the Court's obtuse statements regarding the availability of the Fifth
Amendment privilege and its failure to distinguish between the inves-
tigative and trial stages of a case.15
The Court's decisions regarding the scope of the privilege fall into
two general categories depending upon the status of the person assert-
ing the privilege. One category consists of individuals resisting the
production of personal documents while the other consists of corporate
custodians seeking to protect records that would be personally incrim-
inating. Regardless of the person's status, however, the Court has
never recognized explicitly in its reasoning that a Fifth Amendment
issue arose only in the investigative stage and not during the subse-
quent prosecution. The clear language of the privilege, however,
should prohibit the government from compelling a person to provide
incriminating evidence at trial. Yet, the Court has used language in
its opinions that evokes issues more relevant to the trial phase of a
criminal case than the investigative phase. Thus, the scope of the
Court's Fifth Amendment analysis is confusing.
The Court has not faced directly the question whether the com-
pelled production of evidence that may be permissible at the investiga-
tive phase of a case, when the privilege against self-incrimination does
not apply, should govern the availability of the Fifth Amendment
right at trial to prevent the use of compelled testimony. The Court's
offhand use of trial-related evidentiary terms such as "authentication"
ever being introduced against him at a criminal trial although the defendant
would be required to provide truthful testimony in pretrial proceedings).
15. The investigative phase of a case is prior to the grand jury's handing up an indict-
ment or the prosecutor's filing a criminal complaint, and the trial phase is after
the institution of formal charges. Cases involving the production of records usu-
ally entail the government's seeking the records during the investigative stage.
In most white collar criminal cases, which frequently involve the production of
records, the eventual defendant is not arrested but agrees to appear after the
entry of the formal charges. In discussing the two phases of a criminal case,
questions relating to the arrest of a defendant and providing a preliminary hear-
ing are not considered because they are largely irrelevant to the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege.
[Vol. 77:34
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of records produced to a grand juryi 6 obscures the fact that the proper
interpretation of the privilege limits the Fifth Amendment's availabil-
ity to a custodian only during the investigative stage, not the adjudica-
tive stage when that person has been charged as an individual. The
government's authority to compel a custodian to produce documents
during the investigative phase, when the privilege is unavailable, does
not necessarily govern the application of the privilege against self-in-
crimination at trial. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's poor choice
of words in analyzing the scope of the Fifth Amendment has led lower
courts to the mistaken conclusion that the availability of the Fifth
Amendment privilege is identical for each phase of a proceeding. Once
lost, the privilege cannot then be asserted by a witness on the same
subject at trial.
This Article considers the tension between the privilege against
self-incrimination and the government's authority to require a custo-
dian to furnish documents and testify about them when those state-
ments will be used by the prosecution to seek the admission of the
records at trial. While the language of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
the government from forcing a defendant to testify at his criminal
trial, the rationale adopted by courts for requiring a custodian of
records to provide information about documents undermines the pro-
tection afforded the witness at trial. This diminished constitutional
protection is a result of confusion arising from the Supreme Court's
opinions on the availability of the privilege to witnesses responding to
subpoenas for documents, opinions which did not consider the continu-
ing availability of the Fifth Amendment at the trial stage, regardless
of whether a person could invoke the privilege during the investiga-
tive stage.
Part I of the Article reviews the circumstances in which the gov-
ernment seeks documents from the targets of its investigations, and
how the status of the person compelled to produce the records, qua
individual or qua custodian of records, will affect the means by which
the documents can be introduced at trial. Part II discusses generally
the two means by which the Supreme Court avoided the broad lan-
guage of its decision in Boyd v. United Statesi 7 that appeared to block
any compelled production of documents containing incriminating in-
formation. Parts III and IV review the analyses of Fisher v. United
StateslS and Braswell v. United StatesL9 that effectively permit the
16. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412-13 (1976)("As for the possibil-
ity that responding to the subpoena would authenticate the work papers, produc-
tion would express nothing more than the taxpayer's belief that the papers are
those described in the subpoena.")(footnote omitted).
17. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
18. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
19. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
19981
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
compelled production of records in the investigative phase by severely
limiting the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination
both to individuals and to custodians of records. The Article considers
how the Court's language in these cases has also created the errone-
ous impression that the privilege is not available to resist providing
incriminating testimony that will only be used at trial and not during
the investigative phase of the case. Part V then criticizes dictum in
Curcio v. United States2o that "auxiliary" testimony can be compelled
from a custodian of records. The Court's assertion regarding the scope
of the government's authority to compel testimony that is related to
the production of records contradicts Curcio's primary holding and has
been misinterpreted to provide the basis for compelling custodians to
testify personally and possibly to incriminate themselves. The Article
argues that the government's power to compel the production of docu-
ments should not override completely the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege that prevents compelling a person to utter
words or otherwise communicate information that will be used to se-
cure that person's conviction in a criminal proceeding.
II. THE ALLURE OF SUBPOENAING AN
INVESTIGATIVE TARGET
Investigations of economic crimes frequently require the govern-
ment to gather large volumes of documentary evidence. Once col-
lected, the laborious task of sifting pertinent information of possible
criminality from innocuous transactions can take months, sometimes
years.21 Moreover, investigators acting without a guide to the events
which could involve improprieties may be unable to identify whether a
series of apparently normal business transactions constitute a crimi-
nal violation. As prosecutors have escalated the number of investiga-
tions and prosecutions of white collar crimes over the past twenty
20. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
21. An example of the delay that can occur between the transactions which are the
subject of a criminal prosecution and the commencement of formal proceedings
came up for review in United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996). The
district court dismissed an indictment of two defendants for bank fraud that the
grand jury handed up in November 1992, concerning seven loans that all closed
in June 1985, on the ground that the pre-indictment delay violated the defend-
ants' Fifth Amendment due process rights. See United States v. Crouch, 835 F.
Supp. 938, 943 (S.D. Tex. 1993). The government argued to the district court that
it could not complete its investigation earlier due to "insufficient personnel avail-
able to investigate or properly prepare" the case. Id. at 946. A divided panel of
the Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal in United States v. Crouch, 51 F.3d 480
(5th Cir. 1995), but the full court, sitting en banc, reinstated the indictment be-
cause the defendants failed to show that the government intentionally delayed
indicting the case in order "to gain tactical advantage or to advance some other
improper purpose." United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1511 (5th Cir.
1996)(en banc).
[Vol. 77:34
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years, they increasingly have sought proof of criminality directly from
the investigative target, regardless of a refusal to cooperate, either by
issuing a subpoena duces tecum 2 2 or by executing a search warrant.2 3
By compelling the likely defendant to produce documents, the prosecu-
tors hope to learn, inter alia, what acts are relevant to the investiga-
tion and what the target knew at the time, based on the creation or
possession of records. The following hypothetical example illustrates
the attraction of securing documents from an investigative target and
the Fifth Amendment issue that inheres when the government obtains
documents without the consent of the person who will be the defend-
ant in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
The government has information that a bank president directed
home mortgage loan applicants at the bank to use the services of a
local title company to conduct property closings. The president had a
secret agreement with the title company to have $250 kicked back
from the closing costs paid by each client referred. The title company
remitted the funds to a corporation formed by the president, with each
check payable to the corporation and containing a notation that the
payment was a "consulting fee."24
A key step in the investigation would involve the government's ef-
forts to obtain records from the president's corporation that show re-
ceipt of the funds and any consulting agreements with the title
company. These corporate documents could provide pivotal informa-
tion demonstrating illegal conduct by the president. If the govern-
ment secures the records, 25 it may show the actus reus of a crime, such
as receipt of an illegal gratuity by a bank officer,26 and may reveal the
22. A grand jury may issue a subpoena requiring the recipient to produce documents
or other tangible items, see FED. R. Cami. P. 17(c), and the government need not
show probable cause for the subpoena to be enforced. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra
note 3, at § 8.3(c).
23. The Fourth Amendment requires that items seized pursuant to a warrant must
be "particularly described." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. A search warrant can spec-
ify any type of item or area, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and there
is no Fifth Amendment privilege to resist the seizure of specified items pursuant
to a valid warrant. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 477 (1976) (seizure
of business records described in search warrant).
24. The government can obtain copies of the checks from the title company's bank,
see Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3413(I) (1994)(disclosure require-
ments not applicable to grand jury subpoena for bank customer financial
records), and can also subpoena the title company for all records relating to its
consulting arrangements.
25. See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
48 U. PrIr. L. REV. 27, 47 & n.104 (1986)(when the government does not have
independent evidence that the target possesses the records, "common sense and
experience suggest that incriminating evidence frequently will not be produced"
unless the person is "exceptionally honest or exceptionally stupid").
26. Such an arrangement with a bank officer likely runs afoul of the bribery statute
prohibiting financial institution employees from receiving any gratuity in connec-
19981
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president's knowledge of the source and amount of the payments.
Moreover, possession of incriminating documents probably forecloses
the president from asserting the defenses of lack of knowledge of the
transactions or the good faith belief that the funds were unrelated to
the bank's business. 27 The documents, together with any information
the government investigators gather showing surreptitious transfers
or misleading accounting, would be strong circumstantial evidence of
a specific intent to defraud or mislead.28
The government's customary means for gathering the documents
would be the issuance of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum to the
president as the custodian of the corporation's records. The grand
jury's authority to compel the production of the documents rests on its
historic role as the principal means of investigating crimes. A grand
jury is entitled to "every man's evidence," 29 and can issue subpoenas
to compel testimony and the production of evidence without resort to
the courts. Another avenue available to secure the documents would
be for the investigators to request that the court issue a warrant to
search for and seize evidence of criminal behavior.30 Neither the rules
tion with the bank's operations. See 18 U.S.C. § 215 (1994)("an officer ... of a
financial institution ... [who] corruptly accepts or agrees to accept, anything of
value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with
any business or transaction of such institution").
27. The criminal violations for which the hypothetical banker most likely would be
charged are specific intent crimes, so she could argue that her actions were in
good faith and therefore she did not have the requisite intent to be convicted. See
JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 12.05[A] (2d ed. 1995).
28. See, e.g., United States v. LeDonne, 21 F.3d 1418, 1426 (7th Cir. 1994)(fraudulent
intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from the
totality of the prosecution's evidence); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700
(9th Cir. 1976)("To act 'knowingly,' therefore, is not necessarily to act only with
positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability of
the existence of the fact in question. When such awareness is present, 'positive'
knowledge is not required.").
29. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972)(citations omitted). The grand
jury's powers include the authority to investigate "merely on suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
30. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-01, 306-307 (1967)(rejecting "mere evi-
dence" rule and holding that government can search for any evidence of criminal-
ity if probable cause exists). The Fourth Amendment provides that "[tihe right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV. In order to search for records and seize them, the government must meet the
constitutional requirements of the Warrant Clause by "particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id. It is quite
unlikely that any of the common exceptions to the Warrant Clause, such as the
automobile or search incident to arrest exceptions, can be invoked to permit the
seizure of documents, especially records related to business activity that are cre-
ated and stored as part of the normal operation of a commercial establishment.
The advantage of using a search warrant to obtain records is that they are imme-
[Vol. 77:34
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of evidence nor the exclusionary rule constrains the scope of the grand
jury's consideration in determining whether there is probable cause
that a crime has been committed. 3 1
If the government obtains documents from the president's corpora-
tion in the course of its investigation, the prosecutor will likely want
to use them at trial if the government files criminal charges against
the president individually. Unlike information presented to a grand
jury, documents that the government seeks to use at trial must meet
the evidentiary requirements to authenticate the records and produce
sufficient indicia of reliability for the admission of hearsay, i.e., out-of-
court statements "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."32 While grand juries have a broad mandate to investigate
criminal activity and may consider any evidence to make a probable
cause determination,3 3 a petit jury in a criminal case is limited to reli-
able, relevant evidence that a judge decides meets the requirements
for admissibility. Simply obtaining documents with a subpoena or
warrant does not guarantee their admission into evidence at trial.
The government, therefore, may try to use its authority to compel the
production of records as part of its investigation to further require
that a witness provide the necessary information to secure admission
of the documents at trial.
When the government obtains documents from the target of its in-
vestigation, the circumstances under which it procures the items can
diately available upon seizure, and there is no Fifth Amendment issue raised in
connection with gathering them. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S 463, 473-74
(1976)("[A]Ithough the Fifth Amendment may protect an individual from comply-
ing with a subpoena for the production of his personal records in his possession
because the very act of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of
incriminating information... a seizure of the same materials by law enforcement
officers differs in a crucial respect-the individual against whom the search is
directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of
incriminating evidence."). The government does not rely on the person from
whom it seized the records to respond in any way, although any statements made
during the search would likely be used against that person.
31. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (grand jury's power to
investigate based on evidence obtained through an illegal search is not re-
stricted)(footnote omitted); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-364
(1956)(indictment cannot be dismissed because it was based solely on hearsay
inadmissible at trial); FED. R. EviD. 1101(d)(2) (The rules (other than with re-
spect to privileges) do not apply in the following situations: . . .[p]roceedings
before grand juries.").
32. FED. R. EviD. 801(c). The Rule defines a statement as either "an oral or written
assertion or... nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as
an assertion." FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
33. See United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991)('The function
of the grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its
investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has
occurred. As a necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the grand
jury paints with a broad brush.").
1998]
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affect substantially the ultimate admissibility of the records at trial
because of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
In order to be introduced at trial, the prosecution must show both that
the documents are authentic, i.e., "that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims,"3 4 and that they should not be excluded as hear-
say.3 5 When the target of the investigation produces the documents,
he or she becomes a tempting source for the authentication testimony
and information that will allow admission of the records. 3 6
The question of whether the government can compel the produc-
tion of records appears simple, but the answer is decidedly compli-
cated. The complexity can be traced to Boyd v. United States,3 7 the
first case decided by the Supreme Court that considered a privilege
claim relating to the production of documents. The Court in Boyd as-
serted that compelling the production of incriminating records vio-
lated the witness's right to privacy under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.38 Although the Court has never overturned explicitly
its initial statement in Boyd, such broad protection for documentary
evidence has not stood the test of time. The Court has whittled away
the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege to resist the produc-
tion of records by adopting new tests for when a witness can claim the
privilege. 3 9
The Court's analysis of the scope of the privilege against self-in-
crimination for those called upon to produce records relies primarily
34. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
35. Hearsay statements are excluded unless they are admissible under an exception
to the hearsay rule. Documents may be admissible as business records, see FED.
R. EVID. 803(6); as present sense impressions, see id. 803(1); recorded recollec-
tions, see id. 803(5); or even under the residual exception. See id. 803(24). Simi-
larly, documents that contain admissions of a party-opponent are not subject to
the hearsay rule and are therefore admissible without meeting the requirements
for an exception. See id. 801(d)(2).
36. The seizure of records under a warrant does not resolve evidentiary questions
regarding the admission of those documents at trial. For example, records seized
from a business can be authenticated as those taken from a particular location by
an agent who seized them, but linking them to a particular defendant or estab-
lishing that they are in fact the records of the business is a different question that
the agent cannot address. In United States v. Schultz, 917 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D.
Iowa 1996), the government's witnesses testified only that the documents it
sought to introduce at trial were "consistent with" those seized from two locations
controlled by the defendant, which "did not suffice to satisfy the authentication
requirements" that they were in fact the records seized in the search. Id. at 1340-
41. The district court found that the defendant's failure to object to the lack of
proper authentication testimony made any error in admitting the records harm-
less. See id. at 1341.
37. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
38. See id. at 634-635.
39. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988)("Hale [v. Henkel] carved
an exception out of Boyd by establishing that corporate books and records are not
'private papers' protected by the Fifth Amendment.").
[Vol. 77:34
FINDING WHAT WAS LOST
on the label attached to the witness's act of production, not the degree
of incrimination involved or the potential use of the information in a
subsequent prosecution of the witness. The decisions concerning the
Fifth Amendment in the context of demands for documents do not ad-
dress the deeper question: whether the government can use a person's
testimonial act of producing documents, compelled in the investigative
phase of a case, as evidence to convict that person in a criminal trial.
III. PRIVACY, PAPERS, AND THE PRIVILEGE: OVERCOMING
THE LEGACY OF BOYD V. UNITED STATES
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court proclaimed that
the government could not compel a person to produce documents
which could be used against him because the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments prohibited "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a
man's ... private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a
crime or to forfeit his goods .... -40 Taken at face value, Boyd's broad
interpretation of the constitutional privacy right would make it virtu-
ally impossible to force any person to surrender records in a govern-
ment investigation.4 1 By the turn of the century, however, Congress
had adopted economic regulatory statutes which included criminal
provisions directed against corporations and its directors. 42 Any effort
to enforce these provisions required a narrower view than Boyd's of
the Fifth Amendment protection of documentary evidence; otherwise,
the government's power to combat abusive practices would be stymied
at the outset.
The Court's first limitation on Boyd's protective approach for docu-
ments came in Hale v. Henkel,43 a 1906 decision that involved a sub-
poena for corporate records in an antitrust investigation of the tobacco
industry. The Court held that the custodian subpoenaed for the corpo-
ration's records could not assert the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion because that would effectively permit the organization to resist
40. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
41. See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White
Collar Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L.
REv. 405, 416 (1993)[hereinafter Henning, White Collar Crime]("If taken to its
logical extreme, Boyd would prevent the government from obtaining any docu-
ments that qualified as the property of the person subpoenaed, including a corpo-
ration. .. ."); Robert Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-
Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. REV. 439, 449 (1984)("Logically, Boyd
would suppress property owned by corporations as well as by natural persons.").
42. E.g., Elkins Act, ch. 708, §§ 1, 3 32 Stat. 847, 847-48 (1903)(providing first civil
and then criminal penalties for illegal freight charges); Sherman Act of 1890, ch.
647, §§ 1-3, 8 26 Stat. 209, 209-10 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1994))(providing criminal penalties for "combination... in restraint of trade");
Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, §§ 9-10 24 Stat. 379, 382-83 (1887)(providing
civil and criminal penalties for violations).
43. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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producing documents.44 The hypothetical bank president who chose
to form a corporation to receive illicit payments could not resist the
government's subpoena for records because Hale v. Henkel made the
form of the organization the focal point for determining the availabil-
ity of the privilege.45
To reach this result, the Court did not engage in a comprehensive
analysis of why corporations should be treated differently from indi-
viduals. Instead, the Court put forth a result-oriented rationale, justi-
fing its holding on the ground that permitting a corporation to assert
the privilege "would result in the failure of a large number of cases
where the illegal combination was determinable only upon the exami-
nation of such papers."46 The Court reaffirmed Hale v. Henkel and
what had come to be called the collective entity doctrine in Braswell v.
United States,4 7 which mandated that a custodian of records "may not
resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment
grounds" 48 regardless of the size or complexity of the organization. 49
The Court's second proscription on the scope of Boyd came in
Fisher v. United States5 O which held that the contents of voluntarily
created documents were not protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination because only the physical act of producing the records
pursuant to the subpoena could be testimonial, and therefore poten-
tially incriminating, for Fifth Amendment purposes. 51 In Fisher, the
44. See id. at 74.
45. See id. at 74-75.
46. Id. at 74. See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability:
Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in
Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REv. 793, 819 (1996)(arguing that the Court
rejected a corporate Fifth Amendment privilege claim in order to preserve the
government's ability to use its criminal enforcement authority to police the ac-
tions of corporations).
47. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
48. Id. at 109.
49. See id. Braswell adopted the same rationale as Hale v. Henkel, noting that "rec-
ognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the records custodians of col-
lective entities would have a detrimental impact on the Government's efforts to
prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious problems confronting law
enforcement authorities." Id. at 115 (footnote omitted).
50. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
51. For the purpose of asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege, the compelled pro-
duction of "required records" is equivalent to the seizure of records with a war-
rant, even though the government uses a subpoena to compel the production that
would appear to permit the witness to invoke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether docu-
ments qualify as a required record: (1) were they created pursuant to a statutory
scheme that is essentially regulatory and not criminal; (2) are the records of a
type normally maintained; and, (3) do the records have a "public aspect" to them.
Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968). See Smith v. Richert, 35 F.3d
300, 302 (7th Cir. 1994)("[I]f the documents were required records, the person
could not resist the subpoena on this ground, for the only acknowledgment con-
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Court stated that "[tihe act of producing evidence in response to a sub-
poena.., has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the
contents of the papers produced."52 The act of production was testi-
monial because it conveyed information about the existence, posses-
sion, or authenticity of the documents. A subpoena to the hypothetical
bank president for production of her personal records, not those of the
corporation, may be subject to an assertion of the privilege because the
response may incriminate the president individually.
The Fisher Court explained, however, that the communicative as-
pect of the act of production may not be protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination if the information conveyed was not incrim-
inating. The act of production would not be subject to the privilege if
the information was "a foregone conclusion and the [witness] adds lit-
tle or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by
conceding that he in fact has the papers."53 Fisher focused the Fifth
Amendment analysis on the heretofore unnoticed aspect of physically
responding to a subpoena as the sole basis for asserting the privilege,
removing from the constitutional inquiry any consideration of whether
the documents incriminated the person who created or possessed
them.5 4
veyed by compliance would be of the existence and applicability of the regulatory
program that required him to maintain the records."); United States v. Spano (In
re Grand Jury Subpoena), 21 F.3d 226, 230 (8th Cir. 1994) (enforcing subpoena to
sole proprietor for required records "despite the self-incriminating and testimo-
nial aspects of the production"). Much like a seizure pursuant to a warrant, the
person compelled to turn over required records may not resist on the ground that
the production resulted in testimonial incrimination. Similarly, the status of the
documents as required records does not establish necessarily that they are the
records of the particular business subpoenaed. Trial-related questions involve a
different type of evidence that is not contained in the items subpoenaed, and the
act of production does not always supply the basis for the later admission of the
records into evidence. See generally Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 35
(1948)(footnote omitted)(record required to be maintained under an "appropriate"
regulation). Once a court labels business documents as required records, then no
Fifth Amendment privilege is available to the subpoena recipient.
52. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). The Court noted that the in-
criminating nature of a document does not permit the holder to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege, a point at odds with the apparent thrust of Boyd that a
defendant should never be convicted by his own words. See id. at 410-11. Having
changed the focus of the Fifth Amendment analysis, the Court observed that
Boyd's holding regarding the scope of the privilege "has long been a rule search-
ing for a rationale consistent with the proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment
against compelling a person to give 'testimony' that incriminates him." Id. at
409.
53. Id. at 411.
54. See Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 41, at 421 ("Fisher's analysis is
unnecessarily complicated and focuses on one aspect of the subpoena process, the
act of production, which is largely irrelevant to the real issues of the grand jury
investigation."). In United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the Court created a
gap in its collective entity doctrine in considering the effect of the act of produc-
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Once the Court adopted the collective entity doctrine and limited
the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination to the physi-
cal act of production, Boyd's paean that the Fifth Amendment prohib-
its any governmental "invasion of [the] indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property" lost much of its
force. 55 Instead, the status of the person called on to produce the
records and the nature of the entity responsible for creating or main-
taining the documents played the dominant role, rather than the iden-
tity of the person implicated by the records or even the reason that the
government wanted them.5 6 Justice O'Connor was probably correct
when she noted in the concurring opinion of a later case that "[t]he
notion that the Fifth Amendment protects the privacy of papers
originated in Boyd v. United States, but our decision in Fisher v.
United States sounded the death knell for Boyd."57
The two narrow approaches that confine the scope of the Fifth
Amendment privilege in cases involving subpoenas for records place a
premium first, on determining the way in which a document came into
existence, and second, who the government can compel to produce that
document without regard to whether it can be used later at trial. The
Court's opinions that consider the availability of the privilege against
self-incrimination deal with actions challenging the government's
tion analysis on business records held by the owner of a sole proprietorship.
Although the sole proprietorship's documents were business records identical to
those that a custodian of a corporation's records would be required to produce in
response to a subpoena duces tecum, the Court held that the owner was more
akin to an individual responding to a subpoena rather than a collective entity's
custodian. Therefore, the subpoena recipient could assert the privilege against
self-incrimination concerning the act of producing records in response to a sub-
poena. See id. at 612-613.
55. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). While the Court has never repu-
diated Boyd outright, it did note in Fisher that "the precise claim sustained in
Boyd would now be rejected." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976).
In United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated Oct. 29,
1992), 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that Boyd was no longer good law in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions regarding the applicability of the Fifth Amendment to subpoenas for
documents. See id. at 93.
56. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976)("The proposition that the
Fifth Amendment protects private information obtained without compelling self-
incriminating testimony is contrary to the clear statements of this Court .... )
(citations omitted); Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 41, at 425 ("It is
even possible ... for a person to own two businesses, one a corporation and the
other a sole proprietorship, and be able to assert the privilege to resist production
of one set of records yet be forced to produce the records for the other business.").
57. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 609 (1984)(O'Connor, J. concurring)(citations
omitted). But see Suzanna Rosenthal Brackley, Note, Now It's Personal: With-
drawing the Fifth Amendment's Content-Based Protection for All Private Papers
in United States v. Doe, 60 BRoOK. L. REV. 553, 573 (1994)(Justice O'Connor's
"sweeping conclusion, that Doe I put an end to the 'fruitless search' for a rationale
to justify Boyd's privacy of papers doctrine, is inappropriate.").
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power to compel the production of records at the investigative stage.
The Court has not yet considered how its analyses might affect a de-
fendant's rights at the trial stage. The individuals asserting the Fifth
Amendment protection had not yet been indicted, so the privilege
question at the trial stage did not arise. Unfortunately, in the Court's
treatment of the scope of the privilege, it used terminology related to
the admission of evidence at trial without fully examining the ques-
tion of whether the privilege applied to the production of documents at
the later stage, and if so, what effect compelling a response to a sub-
poena at the earlier stage had on the availability of the privilege to
prevent use by the government at trial of the compelled response.
IV. FISHER V. UNITED STATES: WHAT DOES
"AUTHENTICATION" MEAN AT THE
INVESTIGATIVE STAGE
A. The Irrelevance of Authentication Before the Grand Jury
In Fisher, as part of an investigation into possible violations of the
tax code, the IRS issued a summons to the taxpayers' attorney for
workpapers prepared by an accountant that reflected the clients' per-
sonal income and expenses. The Supreme Court rejected the taxpay-
ers' argument, based on Boyd, that compelling an individual to
produce personal records was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy:
"[Tihe Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, ap-
plied the Fifth Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisi-
tion or use of evidence which... did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort."58 According to the Court, the Fifth
Amendment only protected the individual from having to testify, not
from producing incriminating evidence, so that only the communica-
tive component of providing documents in response to a subpoena
comes within the ambit of the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court agreed that the physical act of production conveyed in-
formation about a document's existence, possession, and authenticity,
and therefore was testimonial under the Fifth Amendment. 59 But
Fisher did not prohibit the government from requiring the production
58. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976). The Court stated that the
constitutional right to privacy traced its origins to the Fourth Amendment, and
that the framers of the Constitution "did not seek in still another Amendment-
the Fifth-to achieve a general protection of privacy but to deal with the more
specific issue of compelled self-incrimination." Id. at 400.
59. See id. at 410. ('The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena never-
theless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of
the papers produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the exist-
ence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It




of records by an individual just because that act may communicate
information. Instead, the Court held that the government could en-
force the subpoena if it was a "foregone conclusion" that the prosecu-
tion could establish the existence, possession, and authenticity of the
items independent of the act of production.60 If existence, possession,
and authenticity could be shown independently of the communicative
act, then "however incriminating the contents of the accountant's
workpapers might be, the act of producing them.., would not itself
involve testimonial self-incrimination." 6 1 Fisher's foregone conclusion
analysis meant that, once the government demonstrated at the inves-
tigative stage an alternative means to prove the existence, possession,
and authenticity of the records, then the witness could not assert the
Fifth Amendment to resist the subpoena.
Of the three components of the act of production that may be com-
municative, authentication is the most important for any subsequent
use of the records as evidence at trial. In order to introduce an item
into evidence, the party seeking to use it must authenticate the item
by producing "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what its proponent claims."62 The act of production con-
tains a tacit admission that the records are those described in the sub-
poena, i.e., that they are genuine. As Fisher noted, "the 'implicit
authentication' rationale appears to be the prevailing justification for
the Fifth Amendment's application to documentary subpoenas."6 3
The Court concluded that the taxpayers resisting the subpoena "would
be no more competent to authenticate the accountant's workpapers or
reports by producing them than [they] would be to authenticate them
if testifying orally. The taxpayer[s] did not prepare the papers and
could not vouch for their accuracy."64 Therefore, the Court found the
subpoena enforceable because the act of production did not incrimi-
nate the subpoena recipients.6 5
60. Id. at 411.
61. Id. at 410-11.
62. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
63. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412 n.12 (1976) (citing Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64).
64. Id. at 413.
65. See id. ("Without more, responding to the subpoena in the circumstances before
us would not appear to represent a substantial threat of self-incrimination.").
The basis for Fishers conclusion that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the
act of production is not entirely clear because the Court intermingles the testimo-
nial and self-incriminatory aspects of the Fifth Amendment analysis. At one
point in the opinion, the Court notes that while there is "substantial compulsion"
in the act of production, and the work papers might contain incriminating infor-
mation, the subpoena does not compel any testimony: "Therefore, the Fifth
Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the papers on their face
might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only against
being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications." Id. at
409. Similarly, the Court cited as support for its privilege analysis its holding in
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If the Fisher Court meant to apply the usual rules of evidence re-
garding the requirements for proper authentication of evidence, then
Fisher's analysis of the potential authentication by the subpoena re-
cipient's act of production is mistaken.6 6 The standard for authentica-
tion does not require that the witness be able to testify as to the
accuracy of the contents of the document. The Court's analysis, how-
ever, equated the question of accuracy, that the contents of the record
are truthful, with authenticity, that the item is what it purports to be.
The distinction is subtle, but very important when considering the is-
sue of admitting an item into evidence at trial. The Court's statement
implies that if the act of production did not add to the government's
knowledge of the accuracy of the information reflected in the docu-
ment, or if the witness could not testify regarding its truthfulness,
then there was nothing incriminating in producing the document be-
cause the witness's production would not authenticate it.
B. Distinguishing the Investigative and Trial Phases in the
Act of Production Analysis
A better interpretation of Fisher's authentication analysis views
the Court's discussion as limited to whether the taxpayers' act of pro-
duction conveyed any information about the accuracy of the records in
the investigative phase, not whether the information communicated
by the witness authenticated the documents for admission as evidence
at trial. The accuracy question may be important to the prosecutor
and the grand jury, and therefore potentially incriminating, but meet-
ing the technical authentication requirements would be wholly irrele-
another Fifth Amendment case permitting the compelled production of a hand-
writing exemplar because "although the exemplar may be incriminating to the
accused and although he is compelled to furnish it, his Fifth Amendment privi-
lege is not violated because nothing he has said or done is deemed to be suffi-
ciently testimonial for purposes of the privilege." Id. at 411 (citation omitted). At
the end of the opinion, however, the Fisher Court summarized its holding by or-
dering the production of records because "the accountant's documents involved in
these cases would involve no incriminating testimony within the protection of the
Fifth Amendment." Id. at 414.
Fisher's analysis of why the privilege may not apply to the act of production
must be grounded on the fact that the "foregone conclusion" mitigates any incrim-
inating effect of the communication, not that the act somehow loses its communi-
cative nature. As an initial matter, the individual compelled to produce
documents has the privilege unless the government can show it will gain no new
information from compliance with the subpoena; i.e., it learns nothing incrimi-
nating. The question whether a witness transmits information by the act of pro-
duction assumes that there is a communication, and the Fifth Amendment issue
depends on the effect of that testimonial act, not whether it was in fact
testimonial.
66. See Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amend-
ment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REv. 1, 16 (1987)("The Court erred, however, by using
the term 'accuracy' as if it were interchangeable with 'authenticity'.").
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vant in an investigation not bound by the rules of evidence. The
taxpayers in Fisher could not convey any information about the accu-
racy of the workpapers, i.e., the manner in which the accountant pre-
pared them, so there was nothing incriminating in the act of
production. The communicative act could, however, authenticate the
records in a trial-related evidentiary sense, i.e., establish that they
were the accountant's workpapers regarding the taxpayers' liability,
but that particular piece of information was not at issue in the investi-
gative phase.
An authentication analysis that focuses on whether information re-
garding accuracy is important to the party reviewing the records
means that determining whether an act of production incriminates a
witness depends upon the procedural context in which the privilege
claim arises. The accuracy of records may be important at both stages
of a criminal case, and any testimony regarding documents could be
incriminating on that question. Yet, in most cases, any consideration
of the accuracy of the records at the investigative stage can be re-
solved simply by reviewing the documents to determine whether they
appear relevant to the investigation. 67 Therefore, Fisher's "authenti-
cation" information arising from the response to a subpoena may have
testimonial significance about the accuracy of the documents only
when the grand jury or government investigators question seriously
the veracity of the records in making the probable cause determina-
tion that a person should be charged with a crime. The act of produc-
tion in that context makes authentication and accuracy equivalent,
much as the Court suggested in Fisher.68
Authentication is not an issue in the investigative stage unless the
rules of evidence apply to proceedings at that phase. Limiting Fisher's
Fifth Amendment privilege analysis to the investigative context in
67. The only limit on the grand jury's power to subpoena evidence is that it be rele-
vant to the general subject matter of the investigation. See United States v. R.
Enterps., 498 U.S. 292, 300 (1991). Whether the accuracy of a document is im-
portant should be measured by the same criterion as the grand jury's authority to
issue the subpoena compelling the production of records.
68. For example, in cases involving false or inflated billings, such as Medicare fraud,
the investigatory target's records may not reflect the improper claims filed with
the government or insurer. The grand jury may want the records to determine
the target's knowledge of the possible violations so that any implicit statement as
to their accuracy would assist the grand jury. If the billing documents are inaccu-
rate because they conflict with the false or inflated claims submitted for reim-
bursement, then that can show an intent to hide the illegal acts. Similarly, if the
records show procedures that the government can establish the providers did not
perform, then the implicit testimony regarding their accuracy arising from the
act of production can show the defendant's knowledge of the criminal acts. In
either case, the "authentication" derived from the act of production may be in-
criminating at the investigative phase because of the information conveyed about
accuracy, not that the records are authentic for admission at trial.
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which it arose overcomes the Court's suggestion that authentication
under the rules of evidence is equivalent to testifring about the accu-
racy of the records. That limit shifts the question from one of deter-
mining the strict evidentiary question of authentication as a condition
for admitting evidence at trial to one of ascertaining whether the
grand jury would learn anything of importance from the witness' re-
sponse concerning the nature of the documents. Fisher hinted at just
such a limited scope to the act of production analysis when the Court
considered whether the information regarding existence or possession
of the records conveyed in responding to the subpoena would incrimi-
nate the taxpayers. Before reaching the authentication issue, the
Court stated, "[alt this juncture, we are quite unprepared to hold that
either the fact of existence of the papers or their possession by the
taxpayer poses any realistic threat of incrimination to the taxpayer."6 9
Fisher did not present a question arising at trial, and the Court was
careful to note that while two communicative aspects of the act of pro-
duction were not incriminating, that did not foreclose the possibility
that the act of production could incriminate the witness at a later
point in the proceeding.
In United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.,70 the Court, in reviewing
the propriety of a subpoena duces tecum, distinguished explicitly the
investigative from the trial phase of a case. The Court held that chal-
lenges to grand jury subpoenas should not be reviewed according to
the higher standard required for trial subpoenas because "[s]trict ob-
servance of trial rules in the context of a grand jury's preliminary in-
vestigation 'would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the
assurance of a fair trial.'"71 Although R. Enterprises involved con-
struction of a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, the Court's ap-
proach in differentiating between the investigative and trial phases is
instructive for understanding the scope of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. R. Enterprises noted that because "many of the rules and restric-
tions that apply at a trial do not apply in grand jury proceedings," 72
the freedom required at the earlier stage counsels against application
of tests that "invite procedural delays and detours." 73 The Court's ac-
69. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412 (1976)(emphasis added).
70. 498 U.S. 292 (1991).
71. Id. at 298 (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956)). The court
of appeals had quashed a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the govern-
ment could not demonstrate that the records would be both relevant and admissi-
ble at trial, applying the test the Supreme Court adopted in United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699-700 (1974). The Court rejected application of the Nixon
standard on the ground that "[olne simply cannot know in advance whether infor-
mation sought during the investigation will be relevant and admissible in a pros-
ecution for a particular offense." United States v. R. Enterps., 498 U.S. 292, 300
(1991).




knowledgment in R. Enterprises of the government's different needs in
the two phases of a criminal case supports separating the authentica-
tion issue arising from the act of production during the investigative
phase from the technical evidentiary analysis applied at trial.7 4 That
approach is similar to the Court's hesitation to foreclose the witness
from asserting the Fifth Amendment at a later point in Fisher when
the Court noted only that at the particular investigative "juncture" at
which the taxpayers' challenge arose could it not find the communica-
tive act incriminating.7 5
Fisher's authentication analysis should be understood to mean
that information conveyed by the act of production about the accuracy
of the documents is an issue that may be relevant to the grand jury,
but the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply if the government
can establish the accuracy of the records by other means. Fisher
should not be read to suggest that the compelled production of docu-
ments at the investigative stage can be used to establish their authen-
ticity at trial. Most challenges on Fifth Amendment grounds to
subpoenas for documents occur in the investigative phase, when the
government's principal interest is to gather information to evaluate
the legality of an act or transaction. The need to authenticate a docu-
ment at that point, in the technical evidentiary sense, is minimal be-
cause the primary question is whether the records are relevant to the
investigation. 76 Authentication testimony that the government can
introduce at trial, however, will be much more likely to incriminate
the witness because it will facilitate the admission of the records into
evidence.
C. Once Lost, Can the Privilege Be Reasserted?
Lower courts have not distinguished between the investigative and
trial phases for the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege on
the authentication issue. They assume that the Supreme Court's dis-
74. In the context of discussing the role of the Fifth Amendment in constraining the
conduct of police interrogations, Professor Grano makes a similar point regarding
the difference between the investigative and trial phases of a criminal case:
Because successful investigation often depends on the questioning of re-
luctant witnesses and suspects, and on other intrusive strategies as well,
the investigative stage as a practical matter, cannot be subject to the
same restraints that govern the adjudicative stage. The operative rules
will be different because the institutions that dominate the successive
stages of the process have dissimilar functions and responsibilites. Sim-
ply put, an investigation is not, and cannot be a trial.
JOSEPH D. GaANo, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAw 133 (1996).
75. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412 (1976).
76. See In re Matter of Trader Roe, 720 F. Supp. 645, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1989)("There is a
difference between the initial act of surrendering the documents-the act of pro-
duction-and the later evidentiary use of that act as evidence against the
witness.").
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cussion of authentication in Fisher comprehended only the trial-type
proof that the item was what its proponent claimed. This interpreta-
tion of Fisher, in turn, leads lower courts to focus on how the govern-
ment could prove authenticity in a later proceeding that would be
governed by the rules of evidence to decide the availability of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, even though the prosecution seeks
production of the records at the investigative phase of the case and not
to introduce them into evidence at that proceeding. The assumption
appears to be that if the government can demonstrate an alternative
method of authenticating records at trial, then any authentication in-
formation from the act of production can never be incriminating.
Lower courts that view Fisher as adopting a trial-related authenti-
cation analysis rather than an accuracy-related analysis may make
questionable applications of the act of production doctrine. After the
government made a plausible argument that it could authenticate the
documents at trial without reference to the witness's act of production,
the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Rue,77 compelled an individual
to produce records in response to an IRS summons. 78 The circuit
court accepted the government's position that it might proceed to au-
thenticate the documents at trial even though the preliminary investi-
gation had not yet been completed and the grand jury proceeding had
not begun to determine whether there was probable cause that a
crime had been committed.
The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the availability of the privilege as-
sumed that a court's responsibility under Fisher was to determine
whether, during an investigation, the government, without relying on
the investigative target's act of production, could possibly authenti-
cate documents at trial that had not yet been produced. For a court to
decide at a preparatory stage whether proposed methods of authenti-
cating documents would be sufficient to mitigate any incrimination
from the act of production is specious because the authentication anal-
ysis is purely speculative. The court in Rue did not require the gov-
ernment to demonstrate how it would in fact authenticate the records,
only that it make some plausible argument that if called upon it prob-
ably could assemble sufficient proof that the documents were what the
prosecution purported.7 9 Once the government secured the docu-
77. 819 F.2d 1488 (8th Cir. 1987).
78. See id. at 1494 ("[Aluthenticity could readily be established under Rule 901(b)(4)
by comparing the contents of the patient cards with information from other docu-
ments whose authenticity is already established .. ").
79. The focus on authentication as an evidentiary issue can result in a conclusion
opposite of that reached in Rue, with the court quashing a subpoena for docu-
ments because the government could not articulate the means by which it might
authenticate the records. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Subpoenas For Docu-
ments, 41 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit held that a grand jury
could not compel the production of sole proprietorship records "because the [sole
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ments over the assertion of the privilege, because authentication was
a foregone conclusion under Fisher, Rue did not state whether the
prosecution would be limited to the proffered methods of authenticat-
ing the records if it sought their admission at trial. Moreover, once
provided to the government, the contents of the documents themselves
may provide the basis for authentication, information which would not
have been available to the government prior to compliance with the
subpoena.SO By focusing on the narrow evidentiary issue of authenti-
cation, Rue ignored the broader implication in Fisher: whether the act
of production would provide information about the accuracy of the
records, which is the primary concern at the investigative stage.
Fisher's failure to differentiate the government's power at the in-
vestigative and trial stages raises a broader concern: whether trial-
type authentication information conveyed by the defendant in re-
sponse to a grand jury subpoena can be used against that person in a
subsequent criminal proceeding in which the government seeks to in-
troduce the documents. If the government granted a witness immu-
nity for the act of producing records, then it cannot use that
testimonial act against the person at trial.81 But if a court compelled
a person to produce records because it found no incriminating authen-
tication information conveyed by the act of production, then would the
government be able to introduce that testimonial act at trial because
the defendant was not allowed to assert the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege in the earlier phase of the case? A broad reading of Fisher's act of
production approach does not foreclose this possibility ab initio. Thus,
proprietors], as preparers of the documents, would implicitly vouch for the genu-
ineness of the documents." Id. at 380. The Eighth Circuit noted that the govern-
ment had not provided evidence that could independently authenticate the
documents, although the case was only at the investigative phase so the govern-
ment did not have to meet any evidentiary requirements for records it might ob-
tain for use before the grand jury. The circuit court ordered the subpoena
quashed unless the government granted immunity to the subpoena recipients.
80. See United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467, 1474 (10th Cir. 1988)("[O]ther authen-
ticated documents, when compared with the contents of the summonsed docu-
ments, may serve to authenticate them.").
81. See Kastigar.v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)("[Immunity] prohibits the
prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and
it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal
penalties on the witness."); In re J.W.O., 940 F.2d 1165, 1167 (8th Cir.
1991)("Should the government decide to prosecute J.W.O. following the grand
jury investigation, it will be prohibited from any use of the testimonial aspects
relating to J.W.O.'s compelled act of producing the documents against him.");
United States v. McCollom, 651 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Ill. 1987)('McCollom's
immunity prevents the government from using his act of producing the docu-
ments as a means of authenticating them.").
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the act of production can become incriminating in the transition from
the investigation to the trial.8 2
To prevent a witness's compelled testimonial act from being used
against him in a subsequent trial, the assessment of the incriminating
effect of the act of production should be limited to ascertaining any
incrimination only as it may affect the investigative stage. A defend-
ant should be permitted to assert the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion at the trial stage when the prosecution uses any aspect of the act
of production that was compelled at the investigative stage, either by
a subpoena or by the threat of contempt. The court's determination of
the privilege issue should be limited to the preliminary phase in which
the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination occurred. This
interpretation of Fisher becomes more compelling when the denial of
the privilege results from some measure of proof by the government at
a preliminary proceeding about the way it might authenticate the doc-
uments to establish the foregone conclusion required by Fisher. The
prosecution should not then be allowed to dispense with its prior posi-
tion and simply use the defendant's communicative act because it was
not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination before a
grand jury.
The government's power to require the production of records is not
uniform throughout the course of a proceeding, and the authority to
enforce compliance with a subpoena at the investigative phase should
not extend to use of compelled testimony in the trial phase of the case.
82. The determination that a witness cannot assert the Fifth Amendment privilege is
fundamentally different from a grant of immunity. Fisher's foregone conclusion
analysis results in a finding that the communicative act would not be incriminat-
ing, a prerequisite for a witness to assert the privilege. A grant of immunity
eliminates the incriminating effect of the witness' testimony because "a defend-
ants compelled statements... may not be put to any testimonial use whatever
against him in a criminal trial." New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450,459 (1979).
The rationale for such strict treatment of a defendant's statements compelled af-
ter an immunity order is that the immunity is a substitute for the witness's Fifth
Amendment privilege, that the defendant be in roughly the same position after
testifying as if the person had interposed the Fifth Amendment to resist the gov-
ernment's compulsion. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
The Fisher analysis of the incriminating effect of an individual's act of production
does not result in a grant of immunity to the witness, and the Court rejected
expressly any judicial authority to grant immunity to a witness producing records
absent a request by the government for such an order. See United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605, 616 (1984)("We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts to in-
clude prospective grants of immunity in the absence of the formal request that
the statute [18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1994)] requires."). Therefore, the govern-
ment's subsequent use of testimony for which a witness could not assert the privi-
lege against self-incrimination does not receive the same protection as that
accorded an immunized statement, and the prosecution would not appear to be
inhibited from using the statement against a witness in a later proceeding once a




For a court to hold otherwise would mean that, once the government
obtained records, the prosecution could use the act of production at
trial because the defendant could not assert the privilege to prevent
the government from introducing the prior testimonial act. Fisher's
holding is not so broad that it should be interpreted to mean that once
a court finds the privilege inapplicable to resist the production of
records, the witness can never again assert it to block the prosecu-
tion's use at trial of the communicative aspect of production. If lower
courts construe Fisher as establishing the doctrine that once lost, the
privilege can never be regained, then the Supreme Court in Fisher
certainly sounded the death knell for more than just Boyd; it also
sounded the death knell for much of the Fifth Amendment's protection
of individuals compelled to produce documents.
V. BRASWELL V. UNITED STATES: LIMITING USE AT TRIAL
OF THE CUSTODIAN'S ACT OF PRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's act of production analysis in Fisher was a
new approach to the privilege against self-incrimination that turned
the constitutional inquiry away from Boyd's focus on the incriminat-
ing content of the records as the basis for asserting the Fifth Amend-
ment protection.8 3 By focusing on the communicative aspect of
production rather than the inculpatory nature of the documents, the
Fisher Court provided a plausible basis for every custodian of corpo-
rate records to resist producing the entity's documents by arguing that
the act of production was personally incriminating. In Braswell v.
United States,84 the Court emphatically rejected that position, render-
ing irrelevant for Fifth Amendment purposes the personally incrimi-
nating effect of responding to a subpoena on behalf of a collective
entity. What the Court did not consider in Braswell, much like Fisher,
was the next step: whether a custodian could ever assert the privilege
against self-incrimination when the government sought testimony in
addition to the production of records that the prosecutor could subse-
quently use to prosecute the custodian individually.
In Braswell, the government subpoenaed a broad array of records
from two corporations of which the custodian was sole shareholder
and president. Braswell refused to produce the records on the ground
that his act of production would be personally incriminating under
Fisher.85 Rather than extend Fisher's act of production analysis to
83. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-635 (1886).
84. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
85. See id. at 102-03 ("Petitioner instead relies solely upon the argument that his act
of producing the documents has independent testimonial significance, which
would incriminate him individually .... The bases for this argument are extra-
polated from the decisions of this Court in Fisher and [United States v.] Doe."). In
Doe, the Court held that the act of production of business records by a sole propri-
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corporate custodians, the Court held that the collective entity doctrine
barred all corporations from interposing the privilege against self-in-
crimination in response to a subpoena, regardless of the entity's size
or the potential incrimination of the custodian of records.8 6 Braswell
reinforced the presumption that a custodian of records acts only in a
representative capacity, and therefore may not claim the privilege if
doing so would shield the collective entity from complying with a sub-
poena duces tecum.8 7
The Court reasoned that allowing a corporate custodian to invoke
the Fifth Amendment at the investigative stage would involve greater
costs to the government's successful prosecution of criminal activity
than the benefit of bestowing on a custodian the right to assert the
privilege to protect both himself and, ultimately, the organization. If
the custodian were allowed to invoke the privilege, then the govern-
ment's only alternatives for securing the records would be to obtain a
search warrant, which may be impossible for reasons unrelated to the
Fifth Amendment, or to grant immunity to the custodian for the act of
production. The latter option, however, could make the ultimate pros-
ecution of the custodian problematic. The grant of immunity can eas-
ily taint the prosecution's evidence and might place the government's
entire case at risk.88
etor would be personally incriminating, even though the records were similar to
those a collective entity would be compelled to produce. United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605, 613 (1984).
86. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104 (1988). The Court stated:
Had petitioner conducted his business as a sole proprietorship, Doe
would require that he be provided the opportunity to show that his act of
production would entail testimonial self-incrimination. But petitioner
has operated his business through the corporate form, and we have long
recognized that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and
other collective entities are treated differently from individuals. This
doctrine-known as the collective entity rule-has a lengthy and distin-
guished pedigree.
Id.; see also Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 41, at 423 ("Rather than
grapple with the hard issue of reconciling the competing rationales, the Supreme
Court elevated the collective entity doctrine above the act of production privilege
for the records of most business entities.").
87. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1988)(The plain mandate of
[prior] decisions is that without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to
the corporation, or as here, to the individual in his capacity as a custodian... a
corporate custodian such as petitioner may not resist a subpoena for corporate
records on Fifth Amendment grounds.")(citations omitted).
88. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972)(when government
prosecutes a witness granted immunity in the investigative phase of the case, it
bears a "heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was
derived from legitimate independent sources"); United States v. North, 910 F.2d
843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), modified per curiam, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(reversing
conviction of defendant who had testified before Congress under grant of immu-
nity because trial court had not determined whether any witness's testimony had
been influenced in any way by the immunized testimony); Henning, White Collar
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The Court acknowledged a weakness in its view of the custodian
acting solely in a representative capacity if the government's true in-
tent was to prosecute the custodian individually. In that situation,
the government could use the collective entity doctrine to bypass the
privilege against self-incrimination by subpoenaing the putative de-
fendant in the capacity of custodian of records for the purpose of gath-
ering individually incriminating information. To ensure the
production of corporate records, the Court deprived custodians of the
right to assert the privilege, but Braswell observed that "certain con-
sequences flow from the fact that the custodian's act of production is
one in his representative rather than personal capacity."8 9 The Court
prohibited the government from making direct evidentiary use of the
individual's production of the documents in response to the subpoena
in a subsequent prosecution of that custodian.90 Braswell's protection
is limited, however, because it does not provide custodians with full
immunity for the act of production. A statutory grant of immunity
would prevent the government from making any use of the testimonial
act. The Court's limitation, however, allows prosecutors to introduce
the fact of the entity's production at trial.91 That information in turn
can lead to an inference that the defendant's position in the collective
entity is such that he must have been involved in responding to the
subpoena, and therefore has knowledge of the content or existence of
the documents. 9 2 Braswell acknowledged that its evidentiary limita-
tion would not prevent the prosecution from introducing an organiza-
tion's production in the hope that it would incriminate the custodian,
only that it must do so indirectly.93
Crime, supra note 41, at 443 ("The question for the government is whether the
limited grant of use immunity for production of records will taint the documents
such that a subsequent prosecution of the custodian will be prohibited by
Kastigar.").
89. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117-18 (1988).
90. See id. at 118.
91. See id.
92. See id. ("The jury may draw from the corporation's act of production the conclu-
sion that the records in question are authentic corporate records, which the cor-
poration possessed, and which it produced in response to the subpoena."). The
Court stated that its protection for the custodian was not a form of immunity
because that could impose serious costs on prosecuting the custodian at a later
point. Id. at 117.
93. See id. at 118 ("[Ihf the defendant held a prominent position within the corpora-
tion that produced the records, the jury may, just as it would had someone else
produced the documents, reasonably infer that he had possession of the docu-
ments or knowledge of their contents."); see also United States v. Dean, 989 F.2d
1205, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(act of production by former government worker may
not be introduced into evidence under Braswell, although 'jury might infer that
Dean created and kept the records but that inference will not come from Dean's
testimonial act of production."). Using the custodian's act in a more direct way
should result in a violation of Braswell's protection. See United States v. Mc-
Laughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The government's repeated reference
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The origin of this narrow evidentiary protection is obscure. The
Court observed cryptically that "certain consequences flow from"94 the
custodian's act of production. The Court could not have grounded the
prohibition against using the act of production as direct evidence of
the defendant's involvement with the documents on the Fifth Amend-
ment because the rationale of the collective entity doctrine, reaffirmed
in Braswell, was that a custodian could never assert the privilege on
behalf of the corporation. It would be illogical to rely on the Fifth
Amendment privilege as the basis for protecting the person who must
comply with a subpoena when the justification for compelling produc-
tion is that the privilege does not apply.9 5 Although the Court de-
scribed this peculiar evidentiary safeguard as a "necessary
concomitant" of the agency rationale of the collective entity doctrine,9 6
there is nothing in the law of agency that holds an agent immune
when acting on behalf of the principal.9 7
A more likely source of Braswell's limited protection for custodians
was the Court's supervisory power to prevent the prosecution from
overstepping its investigative authority by using the collective entity
doctrine as a subterfuge to gather evidence that would be used to pros-
ecute the representative individually. In United States v. Hasting,98
the Court held that federal courts may formulate procedural rules, in-
ter alia, "to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction
to [the custodian's] incomplete act of production as evidence of his culpability flies
in the face of Braswell and vitiated [his] Fifth Amendment privilege.").
94. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117 (1988).
95. See id. at 128 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)(evidentiary limitation "cannot rest on the
Fifth Amendment, for the privilege against self-incrimination does not permit
balancing the convenience of the Government against the rights of a witness, and
the majority has in any case determined that the Fifth Amendment is
inapplicable").
96. Id. at 118 n.11 ("Rather, the limitation is a necessary concomitant of the notion
that a corporate custodian acts as an agent and not an individual when he pro-
duces corporate records in response to a subpoena addressed to him in his repre-
sentative capacity.").
97. The Court may be relying on the agency law principle that "[an agent, by making
a contract only on behalf of a completely disclosed or partially disclosed principal
whom he has power so to bind, does not thereby become liable for its nonperform-
ance." RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 328 (1957). The problem with look-
ing to the agent's liability on a contract as the basis in Braswell for prohibiting
any direct evidentiary use of the act of production is that the third party, i.e. the
government, is only seeking to use the agency relationship to prove a separate
violation, not to hold the agent liable for acts on behalf of the collective entity.
The act of production has a distinct informational content and is not itself the
basis for holding the agent liable. Moreover, it is quite a stretch to ground a
quasi-constitutional prohibition on evidentiary use of relevant information in a
criminal prosecution on a rule from an area of law that is so far afield that the
Court never saw fit to cite it in support of the evidentiary limitation.
98. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
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rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury ... ."99 Re-
liance on supervisory powers, rather than the Constitution, as the ba-
sis for Braswell's evidentiary use limitation reflects the point,
discussed earlier in connection with Fisher, that the government's
power to investigate criminal activity should not be the vehicle for in-
troducing evidence of a defendant's compelled testimony in a subse-
quent prosecution.100
If the prosecution could make direct use of the act of production to
convict the custodian, then the jury would have evidence that, while
not a specific violation of the Fifth Amendment, contravenes the spirit
of the privilege by allowing the government to compel a person to re-
spond and then use that communicative act to secure a conviction.' 0 1
Moreover, the Court expressly left open the question of whether Bras-
well's Fifth Amendment privilege analysis for collective entities per-
mits any evidentiary use of the corporation's act of production when
99. Id. at 505. Two other considerations that may form the basis for a federal court
exercising its supervisory powers are "to implement a remedy for violations of
recognized rights" and "to deter illegal conduct." Id.
100. The obtuse language regarding the source of the limited protection for custodians
provided in Braswell, and the opinion's direct avoidance of supervisory powers as
the basis for limiting the government's use of the act of production, was probably
because the Court was in the process of narrowing quite dramatically the availa-
bility to lower courts of a supervisory power that could be used to dismiss indict-
ments or reverse convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct or other non-
constitutional violations. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250
(1988), a decision announced the same day as Braswell, the Court overturned the
dismissal of an indictment in which the district court invoked its supervisory
powers to deter prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at 253. The Court held that
absent actual prejudice to the defendant, prosecutorial misconduct before the
grand jury could not be the ground for dismissing an indictment. In a case de-
cided the previous term, United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986), the Court
held that prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury was harmless error af-
ter the defendant's conviction, and therefore the trial court could not use its su-
pervisory power to dismiss the indictment based on the government's actions in
the investigative stage of the case.
Justice Kennedy's dissent in Braswell criticized the majority's effort to miti-
gate the effect of its analysis by prohibiting direct evidentiary use of the act of
production, noting that "[plerhaps the Court makes this concession out of some
vague sense of fairness, but the source of its authority to do so remains unex-
plained." Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 128 (1988)(Kennedy, J., dis-
senting). The majority never directly addressed Justice Kennedy's point, which
may reflect an implicit acknowledgment that the Court imposed a rule designed
to prevent prosecutorial abuse without identifying the true source of the require-
ment as judicial supervisory power so as not to undercut the message of Bank of
Nova Scotia that lower courts should not expansively apply their supervisorial
authority over prosecutors.
101. See United States v. McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1997)(reversing
conviction of corporate custodian in which government introduced custodian's
failure to turn over all corporate financial records as evidence of the custodian's
knowledge).
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the jury would inevitably conclude that the defendant was the only
person who could have complied with the subpoena.10 2
Braswell's indirect creation of a quasi-constitutional limited immu-
nity for custodians, as well as the Court's acknowledgment that in cer-
tain circumstances the collective entity doctrine may prevent the
prosecution from utilizing the corporate act of production, demon-
strates the Court's concern about possible misuse at the trial stage of
the government's investigative power. While Braswell denied the
privilege to a custodian of records, it retained an important aspect of
the Fifth Amendment right for custodians by circumscribing the evi-
dentiary use of a compelled testimonial act at a later stage in a crimi-
nal proceeding. Braswell's convoluted discussion of the need to protect
the custodian despite denying the explicit benefit of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege signals the Court's unwillingness to view the govern-
ment's power to compel the production of records as uniform at both
stages of a criminal case. After Braswell, the privilege against self-
incrimination retains its vitality at trial even if it cannot be asserted
to resist producing records during the investigation.
VI. COMPELLING A CUSTODIAN'S TESTIMONY AS
"AUXILIARY" TO THE ACT OF PRODUCTION
A. Curcio v. United States: Dictum Masquerading as Fifth
Amendment Analysis
At first blush, it seems unlikely that the government would need to
compel a custodian of records to testify orally before a grand jury
about issues related to the admissibility of documents. At the investi-
gative stage of a case, the government only gathers information, and
102. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118-19 n.11 (1988)(noting that if the
custodian were the "sole employee and officer of the corporation," that may lead a
jury to "inevitably conclude that he produced the records"). Braswell was the sole
shareholder and President of the corporation, but that apparently was not suffi-
cient to trigger this additional consideration. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
814 F.2d 190, (5th Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S.
99 (1988). In United States v. Maxey & Co., 956 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ind. 1997),
the district court found that the owner's "conscious decision to incorporate his tax
preparation business rather than operate it as a sole proprietorship" precluded
any Fifth Amendment claim to resist producing records of the corporation. Id. at
829. The Supreme Court's hesitation regarding the availability of the privilege
for a single shareholder corporation, however, appears to have no real effect on
the analysis once the owner chooses the corporate form. See United States v.
Stone, 976 F.2d 909, 911-12 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)("The business could
have been formed as an unincorporated sole proprietorship and production of its
business records protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. [Defend-
ant] chose the corporate form and gained its attendant benefits [and] he cannot




grand juries in most jurisdictions are not constrained by the rules of
evidence in what they may consider. Requiring anything more than
the production of records, then, would appear meaningless. Neverthe-
less, the government has sought to require custodians to provide oral
testimony about the creation, maintenance, and authenticity of docu-
ments subpoenaed from an organization.1 0 3 The genesis of this au-
thority to compel live testimony beyond the act of production springs
from the Supreme Court's dicta in Curcio v. United States,10 4 a deci-
sion that, ironically, applied the Fifth Amendment privilege to rebuff
the government's effort to require a custodian of records to testify.
In Curcio, the government issued a subpoena to the secretary-
treasurer of a union local to produce records to a grand jury investi-
gating labor racketeering.O5 Curcio testified that he did not have pos-
session of the records and therefore could not produce them.106 He
then asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to further
questions about the location or possession of the records, 0 7 and the
District Court found him guilty of criminal contempt for refusing to
answer questions before the grand jury.1 0
On appeal the government argued to the Supreme Court that once
the custodian undertook to represent a collective entity, that person
must either produce the records sought "or account under oath for
their nonproduction, even though to do so may tend to incriminate
him."109 The government relied on the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp.,11o a 1929 decision in which
Judge Learned Hand asserted, "since the production [of records] can
be forced, it may be made effective by compelling the producer to de-
clare that the documents are genuine.... [T]estimony auxiliary to the
production is as unprivileged as are the documents themselves."lln
The Curcio court rejected the government's argument, holding that
the custodian of records did not "waive his constitutional privilege as
to oral testimony by assuming the duties of his office," 112 and that the
voluntary acceptance of the role of custodian overcame the privilege
103. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Apr. 9, 1996, 87 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir.
1996)(quashing subpoena seeking testimony of custodian of records regarding lo-
cation of records not in her possession); United States v. Blackman, 72 F.3d 1418
(9th Cir. 1995)(compelling production of records to IRS and oral testimony to au-
thenticate documents).
104. 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
105. See id. at 119.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 121.
109. Id. at 123.
110. 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1929).
111. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
112. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 124 (1957).
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"only with respect to the production of the records themselves."113
The Court noted that Austin-Bagley was "distinguishable and we need
not pass on [its] validity."114
If Curcio had stopped at that point, the scope of a custodian's Fifth
Amendment privilege would be clear: the government's authority
would extend only to the physical production of documents, because
collective entities may not assert the privilege to resist production of
documents, while a custodian of records could assert the privilege to
resist furnishing oral testimony. While the union's custodian in
Curcio could be required to provide the records, compelled testimony
regarding their location would require the disclosure of information
from the custodian in an individual capacity, at which point the privi-
lege would attach. This approach reflects the thrust of the Court's
later Fifth Amendment decisions that allowed assertions of the privi-
lege for incriminating testimonial acts115 but denied any constitu-
tional protection to an organization or the custodian acting on its
behalf.116
Curcio then went on, however, to accept in large part Judge Hand's
sweeping analysis in Austin-Bagley of the additional testimonial duty
of a custodian beyond the physical act of producing records. After an-
nouncing its holding that the custodian could assert the privilege, the
Court cited Austin-Bagley for the following proposition: "Requiring the
custodian to identify or authenticate the documents for admission in
evidence merely makes explicit what is implicit in the production it-
self. The custodian is subject to little, if any, further danger of incrim-
ination."' 7 This assertion differed markedly from the Court's
distinction, based on the nature of the government's questioning that
sought personal knowledge from the custodian, that permitted the
custodian to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege to resist a demand
for oral testimony. The Court's unexplained acceptance of compelled
auxiliary testimony is confusing in light of its primary holding. It ap-
pears that Curcio held that authentication testimony could never be
incriminating, while Austin-Bagley upheld authentication testimony
because a witness in the role of a custodian could not assert the privi-
lege, regardless of the personal incrimination that might result.1 1 8
113. Id. at 124-25 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911)).
114. Id. at 125.
115. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
116. See Braswell v. United States, 487, U.S. 99 (1988).
117. Id. The Court stated in a footnote that "[tihe leading case of United States v.
Austin-Bagley Corp., explains the scope and limitations of this doctrine." Id. at
125 n.4 (citation omitted).
118. The confusion as to what exactly Curcio meant was reflected in the Court's analy-
sis of the decision in Braswell, when it stated, "[t]he Curcio Court made clear that
with respect to a custodian of a collective entity's records, the line drawn was
between oral testimony and other forms of incrimination." Braswell v. United
19981
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There are two problems with the Curcio dictum accepting the Aus-
tin-Bagley holding that compelling auxiliary testimony would not vio-
late the Fifth Amendment privilege. First, the Court's decisions on
the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege prior to Curcio had only
considered whether the records must be produced, not whether the
custodian's duty could be extended beyond the physical act of produc-
tion. In Hale v. Henkel,1 19 the Court held that a corporation cannot
assert the privilege,120 and in Wilson v. United Statesl21 that a custo-
dian cannot assert the privilege even if the documents are personally
incriminating. 122 Curcio's principal holding, that a court cannot com-
pel additional testimony beyond the production of records, was consis-
tent with prior decisions because it permitted the assertion of the
privilege when the government sought statements from a custo-
dian.123 The demand for oral testimony traverses the line beyond
which the collective entity analysis should no longer apply. The de-
marcation between the actual production and later testimony was cru-
cial because the privilege could not protect the contents of the
business records, but Curcio allowed the custodian to assert the Fifth
Amendment to resist furnishing information that was not contained in
the records themselves.124
The flaw in Curcio's dictum endorsing the duty to furnish auxiliary
testimony was the Court's assumption that the testimony could not be
incriminating because it only related to the records produced. While
the testimony pertains to the documents, the government seeks the
statements as a means to gather information beyond that contained in
the records; otherwise, the prosecution would have no interest in de-
manding the testimony. Therefore, the testimony might be incrimi-
nating beyond the content of the documents. Curcio's assertion that
auxiliary testimony could not be incriminating 25 was based on the
mistaken premise that because the privilege did not protect the con-
tents of business records, it could not protect anyone associated with
producing those documents.
Deciding that an entire category of testimony cannot incriminate a
witness conflicts with the broad test of incrimination adopted in Hoff-
States, 487 U.S. 99, 114 (1988). The Court then quoted Curcio's statement that a
custodian can be compelled to provide authenticating testimony. The bright line
of Curcio was not quite as clear as Braswell asserted.
119. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
120. See id. at 74; see also supra, text accompanying notes 47-49 (discussing develop-
ment of collective entity doctrine).
121. 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
122. See id. at 384-85.
123. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 124, 128 (1957).
124. See id. at 125, 128.
125. See id. at 125.
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man v. United States.126 There, the Court held that testimony could
be inculpatory, and therefore within scope of the Fifth Amendment
protection, when the statements could provide a link in the chain of
evidence that may lead to a conviction, and not just statements that
are explicitly incriminating.1 27 Statements about the authenticity of
records can be highly incriminating if that testimony supports the ad-
mission of documentary evidence used to convict the declarant. Slap-
ping the label "auxiliary" on testimony skips a crucial step in the
privilege analysis by applying an empty formalism rather than an ex-
amination of whether the testimony can incriminate the witness in
light of the government's purpose for demanding it as part of an inves-
tigation or prosecution.
A second problem with the Curcio dictum is its failure to note that
Austin-Bagley differed fundamentally in its view of the custodian's
role and its effect on the privilege against self-incrimination. The Sec-
ond Circuit held that one's acceptance of the role of custodian "not
only exposes [him] to producing the documents, but to making their
use possible without requiring other proof than his own."128 This
statement conflicts with Curcio's primary holding that custodians
must produce records, but need not testify. The testimony compelled
from the defendant in Austin-Bagley, that the records were authentic,
was quite similar to the information the government sought in Curcio
from the union's custodian regarding the location of the books. Both
types of information should be within the knowledge of a custodian,
and both can be equally incriminating to the declarant. Yet, the
Curcio dictum adopted the inconsistent position that statements re-
garding the authenticity of records were auxiliary, and therefore ex-
empt from any privilege claim, while a witness could assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege to resist testifying about their location or pos-
session by another person.i 29
The Court's terse discussion of Austin-Bagley also glossed over the
most troublesome aspect of the Second Circuit's decision permitting
the government to compel testimony about the documents from a cor-
porate custodian. In Curcio, the Court, ignoring the fact that the wit-
ness was a defendant in the case, stated only that the prosecution in
Austin-Bagley had called a corporate officer to authenticate the
records.130 The Second Circuit did not question the government's
126. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
127. See id. at 486 ('The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in
themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise em-
braces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prose-
cute the claimant for a federal crime.").
128. United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d. Cir. 1929).
129. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125, 128 (1957).
130. See id. at 125 n.4 (1957). In Austin-Bagley, the government charged a corpora-
tion and its officers with conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act in
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right to call a defendant as a witness that apparently flowed from the
authority to compel the production of corporate records. Austin-Bag-
ley's acceptance of the prosecution's right to compel a defendant to tes-
tify in its case-in-chief exemplified the Second Circuit's flawed
assumption that once a court held the Fifth Amendment privilege was
unavailable to a witness it could never be regained.1 31
Curcio's viability as precedent for permitting the government to
compel custodians to furnish oral testimony authenticating records as
merely auxiliary to the act of production is open to question. As an
initial matter, the Court did not have to reach the issue of whether
live testimony could ever be required, having noted that it did not
need to pass on the validity of Austin-Bagley.i3 2 Further, Austin-Bag-
ley's assertion that the nature of the records removed any constitu-
tional protection for the custodian conflicted with Curcio's primary
holding that oral testimony beyond the production of records remained
subject to the privilege against self-incrimination. Austin-Bagley
looked to the nature of the documents as the basis for rejecting the
privilege claim, while Curcio, consistent with the language of the Fifth
Amendment, upheld the personal right of the custodian to resist being
compelled to speak against himself.1 33 Although Curcio's dictum
claimed to accept the analysis of Austin-Bagley, Judge Hand's opinion
endorsed an unwarranted extension of the government's authority to
compel testimony from a defendant solely because the defendant was
also the custodian of records. Austin-Bagley's analysis of the scope of
the privilege is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's holding in
Curcio that the Fifth Amendment protection does not disappear when
a person assumes the role of custodian of records.13 4
connection with a scheme to sell alcoholic beverages, and during trial called an
individual defendant to produce records and testify as to their authenticity.
United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233-34 (2d. Cir. 1929).
131. See United States v. Medlin, 986 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1993)(To the extent a
custodian of records "will be called on merely to identify and authenticate the
documents he is required to produce-which the government argues in its brief is
the only testimony that will be sought from him-that argument is without
merit."); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe Co., Inc.), 838 F.2d 624, 626
(1st Cir. 1988)("We perceive no significant distinction between authentication
provided orally and the same provided by some other physical act: the key point
is that both methods are 'testimonial' for purposes of the fifth amendment.");
United States v. Raniere, 895 F. Supp. 699, 707 (D.N.J. 1995) (custodian of
records "must not only produce the documents sought in the IRS Summons-he
must also provide authentication testimony as to those documents").
132. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957).
133. See id. at 128.
134. See id. at 123.
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B. The Legacy of Curcio: "Auxiliary" Testimony and the
Business Records Exception
The level of proof necessary to authenticate records for their ad-
mission at trial is low, and there are a variety of means to establish
that the item is what its proponent claims. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence provide a list of illustrations for meeting the requirement, in-
cluding proof of authenticity by the item's "[aippearance, contents,
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,
taken in conjunction with circumstances. 135 In civil litigation, the
presence of documents in a party's files or the production of records
during discovery can be sufficient to authenticate those documents. 136
In United States v. Newton,137 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit upheld, in a criminal prosecution, the trial court's
finding of authenticity regarding an unsigned, undated, typed docu-
ment admitted in a criminal prosecution. The circuit court stated that
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the evidence
over the defendant's authentication objection because there was "ex-
ternal evidence of the truth of the statements in the document ...
introduced by the government."13
The question arises why the government would even ask for au-
thentication testimony of the type apparently sanctioned in Curcio
when there are a number of avenues available, aside from the investi-
gative target's testimony, that avoid the Fifth Amendment privilege
question. The answer is that, at least in some cases, other forms of
authentication proof may not be open. For example, while the Federal
Rules of Evidence permit nonexpert testimony concerning the genu-
ineness of handwriting to authenticate a document, 13 9 now that so
many records are stored on computer disks it may be impossible to
authenticate a printed document or the computer file without relying
on the creator of the item to testify that it is what it purports to be.
Moreover, regardless of other methods of authentication, there is an
incentive to have the investigative target provide authentication testi-
135. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
136. See E.W. French & Sons, Inc. v. General Portland Inc., 885 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th
Cir. 1989); Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1988).
Under recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties must pro-
vide copies of documents "that are relevant to disputed facts" and the fact that a
party produced those items could authenticate them. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). More-
over, in civil litigation a party can submit written requests for admissions from
the opposing party, and that can include requests authenticating evidence. FED.
R. Civ. P. 36. There is no counterpart to these liberal discovery rules in criminal
proceedings.
137. 891 F.2d 944 (1st Cir. 1989).
138. Id. at 947.
139. See FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(2) ("Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of hand-
writing, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation").
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mony. If the government can compel a target to provide the informa-
tion, then that person cannot contradict those statements at a later
time without running the risk of being impeached or even charged
with perjury. In effect, the government secures admission of the
records by cutting off a potential objection by the defendant.14o
The possibility that the government will be unable to authenticate
important documents is low. Only in rare cases in which the sole
source of authentication information is the defendant would there be a
question about the government's authority to compel testimony. If the
prosecution's interest in compelling custodians to testify at the inves-
tigative phase was limited to just authentication testimony, then the
Fifth Amendment privilege question would be of relatively minor im-
portance to witnesses because their testimony would be unlikely to
have much effect in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 14 1 The prob-
lem, however, is that the government has used Curcio's imprimatur to
compel auxiliary testimony as the platform for asserting a broader au-
thority to compel testimony concerning other evidentiary issues. In
short, the government advocates an expansive definition of what is
auxiliary to the act of production, trying to take Curcio's dictum far
beyond its original context.
Not only must a document be authentic, but, because it contains
statements that usually constitute hearsay, it must also meet the
trustworthiness requirements of the rules of evidence in order to be
admitted.4 2 The prosecution's motive for compelling testimony from
the custodian at the investigative stage is not merely to make "explicit
what is implicit in the production itself,"'143 but to have the custodian
140. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957 F.2d 807, 812 (11th Cir.
1992)(enforcing subpoena to former bank chief executive officer for documents
copied from bank's files and removed to personal residence when the government
already had copies of the corporate records on the ground that "[t]o allow a custo-
dian to relieve himself of the burden of the collective entity doctrine simply by
finding a 'personal reason' to abscond with the corporate documents is manifestly
contrary to the rationale of Braswell").
141. The nature of the corporate entity on whose behalf the custodian must testify
would be crucial to determining whether providing authentication testimony
would be harmful to the custodian. If the entity was a one-person corporation in
which the defendant was the sole shareholder, then authenticating the docu-
ments by other means could be problematic because only a limited number of
others would be able to testify about the records. See United States v. Blackman,
72 F.3d 1418, 1426 (9th Cir. 1995)(custodian of small law firm compelled to pro-
duce records and authenticate documents); United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909,
912 (4th Cir. 1992)(owner of "one-man operation" can be compelled to furnish
records because he "chose the corporate form and gained its attendant benefits,
and ... cannot now disregard the corporate form to shield his business records
from production").
142. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 802 ("[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules").
143. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957).
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provide the additional foundation on which incriminating evidence
can be introduced to convict that witness in a later proceeding. The
government seeks not just authentication testimony but the admis-
sion of records without further evidence beyond the words of the inves-
tigative target. Moreover, it demands this testimony not for use in the
investigation of the crime, but as a means to introduce evidence at the
trial stage of the proceeding, when the witness is the defendant.
1. Compelling Evidentiary Testimony to Avoid Hearsay
Problems
Records of business transactions usually are crucial to the prosecu-
tion of economic crimes because they provide circumstantial proof of
the defendant's knowledge or participation in an illegal act. There are
two primary methods of introducing into evidence at trial statements
contained in corporate records. One is by showing that the statements
are an admission by a party-opponent. The other is by showing that
the documents constitute records of regularly conducted business ac-
tivity. Under the first method, if the statement comprises an admis-
sion by the defendant, then it falls outside the category of hearsay,
and the court usually admits it.144 The Federal Rules of Evidence pro-
vide that a statement constitutes an admission when made in either
the defendant's individual or representative capacity, or when made
by an agent of the defendant who is authorized to speak on the
subject.14 5
Because most transactional documents do not contain declarations
attributable to the defendant, the more common method of introduc-
tion is under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. In
order to meet the requirements of the business records exception, the
government must show that the documents were created "at or near
the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowl-
edge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity,
and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make" the
144. See FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(2). All evidence is subject to exclusion under Rule 403,
which permits a court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence "if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
145. See FED R. Evm. 801(d)(2)(D). The proponent of the statement must show the
following: "(1) the existence of the agency relationship, (2) that the statement was
made during the course of the relationship, and (3) that it relates to a matter
within the scope of the agency." Pappas v. Middle Earth Condominium Ass'n,
963 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1992). See also United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648,
660-61 (2d Cir. 1996)("[D]eclarant need not be the 'final decision maker'... for
his statement on those matters to be deemed within the scope of his agency.
Rather, he need only be an advisor or other significant participant in the deci-
sion-making process that is the subject matter of the statement.").
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record.146 In order to establish that the documents are business
records, the government must produce sufficient foundation testimony
regarding the conduct of the business and its recordkeeping practices.
The rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule is that businesses
generally maintain accurate records of their activity, and therefore
the court is safe in presuming the documents are reliable accounts of
the underlying activity once the party offering the evidence meets the
foundational requirements.14 7
In most cases involving business records, especially those produced
by a third party, a defendant does not challenge the admissibility of
the documents because the government usually can call an employee
to testify as to the regularity of creating and maintaining the organi-
zation's records.148 When the entity is involved in criminal activity,
particularly when a defendant controls the organization or is its sole
shareholder, there may be no employee available to verify the docu-
ments. 14 9 In these cases, the government may not have ready access
to the necessary proof of regularity in the collection and recordation of
business activities to meet the threshold reliability requirement for
the court to admit the records under the hearsay exception.150 This
146. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). The Rule defines "business" broadly to include any "busi-
ness, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind,
whether or not conducted for profit." Id.
147. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.43, at 961
(1995)("The exception rests in part on notions of trustworthiness. The regularity
of business and recordmaking, and the routine involvement of the recordmakers
in that task (which the exception requires) assure a kind of expertise and reduce
risks of mistake.").
148. The government generally subpoenas the organization to produce the records,
and a custodian designated by the entity produces them and, if necessary, can
testify about the conduct of the business and maintenance of its records. The
government can subpoena an agent of the organization as the custodian, and de-
mand that the individual specified in the subpoena represent it in producing the
records. See Dreir v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 400 (1911)(witness may not
assert the Fifth Amendment to resist producing records of corporation when sub-
poena addressed only to individual but records called for were those of the corpo-
ration and not personal); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 86 (D.C. Cir.
1989)(custodian named in subpoena to produce corporate records cannot resist
subpoena on the ground that the corporation could designate another custodian);
Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 41, at 433 ("The determination of who
may be a custodian rejects any formalism, and courts will not confine the
designation of a custodian to the person selected by the entity subpoenaed.").
149. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.44, at 965
(1995)("Ideally the proponent offers foundation testimony by the preparer and
original source of the information, and sometimes these are one and the same
person.").
150. See id. at 966 ("But where the foundation witness lacks even circumstantial
knowledge, the record should not be admitted under the exception, and minimal
acquaintance with 'how our records usually look' is not enough to satisfy the
foundation requirements.")(quoting Belber v. Lipson, 905 F.2d 549, 522 (1st Cir.
1990)).
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situation presents the greatest likelihood that the government will
seek to compel the target of its investigation to provide the necessary
testimony for admission of the records into evidence in a subsequent
prosecution of the custodian individually.
2. Calling the Defendant "to be a Witness Against Himself'
The Fifth Amendment privilege question raised by compelling tes-
timony designed to establish the business records exception reaches
the heart of the tension in Curcio between the custodian's personal
right to invoke the privilege to resist testifying and the requirement
that a custodian provide "auxiliary" testimony. In In re Custodian of
Records of Variety Distributing, Inc.,151 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit upheld an order requiring a custodian of
records to testify at a criminal trial about the creation and mainte-
nance of records to establish that the corporate documents met the
business records exception. The custodian was not a defendant in the
prosecution for selling obscene material but refused to testify on Fifth
Amendment grounds because he feared that the government would
prosecute him later for supplying the allegedly obscene materials and
use his testimony to connect him to the illegal transaction.' 52
The Sixth Circuit relied on Curcio's dictum, regarding a custo-
dian's duty to provide auxiliary testimony, to hold that testimony
about the conduct and recordkeeping practices of a business was iden-
tical to authentication testimony because it "merely made explicit
what is implicit in the act of production itself."'53 The circuit court
then asserted that testimony satisfying the business records exception
would not be sufficiently incriminating to warrant invocation of the
Fifth Amendment privilege, and that a corporation should not "be able
to avoid the consequences of a subpoena... by designating as custo-
dian of corporate records an individual who asserts that his knowl-
edge that the corporation regularly keeps records in the course of its
regularly conducted activities is incriminating."' 54
Variety Distributing's extension of the custodian's duty to testify
regarding the recordkeeping practices of the organization is question-
able because the Sixth Circuit equated the admissibility of hearsay
with authentication of records, failing to recognize the different issues
151. United States v. Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. (In re Custodian of Records of Vari-
ety Distrib., Inc.), 927 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1991).
152. See id. at 248. The defendants were a corporation and three employees charged
with selling obscene videotapes, and the prosecution subpoenaed the companies
that supplied the videotapes to the defendants. The custodian was an officer of
one corporation that shipped videotapes to the defendants, and he asserted that
he was the target of an obscenity investigation. See id.
153. Id. at 250 (citation omitted).
154. Id. at 251.
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addressed by the two rules of evidence. 15 5 Proof of one is not necessar-
ily proof of the other, so it is not a fair reading of Curcio's erroneous
endorsement of compelling authentication testimony to include state-
ments that furnish evidentiary proof related to the introduction of doc-
uments at trial under an exception to the hearsay rule.15 6 Yet, by
lumping together authentication and the business records exception,
apparently because both deal with the admissibility of evidence, the
Sixth Circuit expanded the category of auxiliary testimony to include
statements about the conduct of a business that were far removed
from the custodian's duty to produce records.
In addition to misunderstanding the difference between distinct
rules of evidence, Variety Distributing assumed that by designating its
target as a custodian, the government, by simply invoking Curcio's
dictum, could compel that person to provide oral testimony related in
some way to business records. Recognizing such broad authority to
compel testimony poses two threats to the Fifth Amendment privilege.
First, if a custodian of records is never allowed to invoke the privilege
to resist providing auxiliary testimony, then the government can com-
pel that testimony at any point in the proceeding, regardless of when
the custodian produced the documents or the relevance of such testi-
mony at that stage of the proceeding. In In re Grand Jury Empaneled
on April 6, 1993,157 the government, to satisfy the elements of the
business records exception to the hearsay rule, subpoenaed the target
of its investigation to testify before a grand jury about the recordkeep-
ing practices of a corporation in which he was a vice president. 158 The
155. In the Federal Rules of Evidence, authentication and hearsay are dealt with by
separate Rules. See Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 41, at 438 ("A docu-
ment may be authentic even though it does not meet the business records excep-
tion. Variety Distributing, however, ignores that distinction.").
156. Variety Distributing tried to soften the blow of its decision by asserting that the
custodian's business records testimony could not be used directly against that
person in a subsequent proceeding because Braswell's evidentiary use protection
applied. See United States v. Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. (In re Custodian of
Records of Variety Distrib., Inc.), 927 F.2d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1991). The problem
with this analysis is that, unlike authenticity, which is an issue for both the judge
and the jury, the court alone determines admissibility of hearsay. See FED. R.
EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning... the admissibility of evidence
shall be determined by the court."). The Braswell protection keeps information
from reaching the jury about the authentication of the records arising from the
defendant-custodian's act of production, although the jury is free to infer that
because the corporation produced the records, the defendant must have known
about them. Braswell does not preclude statements auxiliary to the act of pro-
duction, so a custodian's statements about regular business conduct in a prior
proceeding could certainly be used against him for admission of those records
because there is no direct evidentiary use that reaches the jury. See generally
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
157. 869 F. Supp. 298 (D.N.J. 1994).
158. The investigative target offered to turn over the records and identify them for the
grand jury, but the government sought to enforce the subpoena for oral testi-
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government relied on Variety Distributing for its assertion that "busi-
ness records testimony is outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment
because it will never entail further incrimination independent of the
act of production."' 5 9 The government in April 6 Grand Jury read Va-
riety Distributing's language to support the proposition that a custo-
dian has no Fifth Amendment privilege at any stage of a proceeding to
resist testifying about records.
The business records testimony would be irrelevant to the grand
jury's probable cause determination, however, since it is not bound by
the rules of evidence. The government's motive, therefore, must have
been to prepare for trial by compelling testimony at the investigative
stage that would ensure the admission of the records into evidence at
trial. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
in April 6 Grand Jury rejected the government's argument on the
ground that "the Sixth Circuit's ruling [in Variety Distributing] clearly
expands Curcio and Braswell, under which the only oral testimony
that has explicitly been sanctioned is mere identification and true au-
thentication testimony."' 6 0
United States v. McLaughlin'6 ' shows an interesting twist on the
use of the custodian's act of production that is similar to compelling
testimony regarding the documents. The government subpoenaed one
of the defendants to produce corporate documents as a custodian for a
closely held corporation.' 62 The subsequent production did not in-
clude any record of a bank account held by the corporation.i6S The
government then charged the custodian with tax evasion and conspir-
acy, alleging, inter alia, the custodian's failure to turn over relevant
records.' 6 4 Moreover, the government introduced the custodian's in-
complete production to show that the non-disclosure proved the de-
fendant's intent to evade income taxes.165 The government argued
that the failure to produce records as a custodian was not protected by
mony. The government also rejected the court's recommendation that the corpo-
ration be permitted to identify a custodian who would provide the requested
testimony. See id. at 300. Based on its insistence that only the named custodian
provide the records and testify, it appeared that the government wanted the vice
president's testimony to prevent him from later denying knowledge of the exist-
ence or contents of the records. See id.
159. Id. at 303.
160. Id. at 304. The district court rejected the government's broad argument that ad-
missibility is the equivalent of authentication, stating that "the cases support the
proposition that authentication testimony, a condition precedent to admissibility,
can be compelled; they do not suggest that the admissibility of the documents
under the exceptions to the hearsay rule is guaranteed." Id. at 305.
161. 126 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1997).
162. See id. at 133.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 132-33.
165. See id. at 133-34.
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Braswell because that case only safeguarded the testimonial aspects
of the actual production, not what the defendant failed to do in re-
sponse to the subpoena.166 The Third Circuit rejected this approach
as a distinction without a difference,167 holding that "the testimonial
aspect of production is not limited to the act of handing material over
to the government-it also may include the custodian's exercise of dis-
cretion over which material to produce and which to omit. Incomplete
production may therefore be as communicative as complete produc-
tion."168 McLaughlin demonstrated the government's use of the cus-
todian's testimonial act (to convict the individual), which is similar to
the way that compelled testimony would be used against a custodian
of records, called to furnish information about documents. Either
way, prosecutors try to evade the protection of the Fifth Amendment
to introduce protected testimonial acts against corporate custodians in
their individual capacities.
3. Assessing the Availability of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
in Its Proper Context
Variety Distributing's expansive reading of the government's power
to compel testimony to include statements establishing the business
records exception' 6 9 was traceable to the Supreme Court's misappre-
hension in Curcio about the permissibility of compelling authentica-
tion testimony. 7 0 A better understanding of Curcio that would
undermine Variety Distributing's unwarranted extension of a custo-
dian's duty recalls the particular procedural context in which the
Supreme Court considered the Fifth Amendment privilege claim. The
Court's apparent sanctioning of limited oral testimony auxiliary to the
act of production related only to the investigative phase of the case. 17 1
Curcio should be understood to require the custodian to testify before
a grand jury only to make explicit to the grand jurors what was im-
plicit in the production of the records. Curcio should not be read as
sanctioning an additional means for the government to prepare for
trial.172
166. See id. at 134.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. See United States v. Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. (In re Custodian of Records of
Variety Distrib., Inc.), 927 F.2d 244, 250-51 (6th Cir. 1991).
170. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957).
171. See id. at 119 (involving refusal to answer questions asked by a federal grand
jury).
172. The government in April 6 Grand Jury appears to have sought the business
records testimony at the investigative stage to avoid a limitation on the grand
jury's power, once it returns an indictment. See In re Grand Jury Empaneled on
Apr. 6, 1993, 869 F. Supp. 298 (D.N.J. 1994); see also United States v. Sasso, 59
F.3d 341, 352 (2d Cir. 1995)(evidence obtained by grand jury subpoena issued
after indictment may be used if sole or dominant purpose of gathering evidence
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The Curcio Court failed to recognize the importance of the proce-
dural context for determining the government's authority to compel
testimony. The Court ignored the fact that what may not be incrimi-
nating before the grand jury, because of the lack of evidentiary and
procedural protections afforded investigative targets, may incriminate
the witness in a criminal trial. Variety Distributing compounded this
mistake by citing Curcio as the controlling precedent for compelling
evidentiary testimony related solely to the trial phase, based on the
erroneous conclusion that such testimony was similar to a custodian's
authentication of records at the investigative phase. The authority to
compel additional testimony before the grand jury posed no realistic
threat of incrimination to the custodian because evidentiary issues are
irrelevant at the investigative stage. Curcio's acceptance of compelled
authentication testimony was identical to Fisher's use of production to
demonstrate the accuracy of the records without implicating the privi-
lege because accuracy is irrelevant at the investigative stage. The ac-
tual authentication of evidence may be critical to introducing records
at trial because that evidence may form a substantial portion of the
government's circumstantial proof of the crime. The testimony would
be incriminating and should be subject to the protections of the Fifth
Amendment privilege at the trial stage.
Variety Distributing took a power of the government at the investi-
gative phase and imposed it on the trial phase, expanding it along the
way by broadening the concept of auxiliary testimony that falls
outside the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.
April 6 Grand Jury demonstrated that the government will attempt to
use the grand jury's ample power to compel testimony that can only be
utilized at the trial stage.1 73 This attempt will be based on the misap-
prehension fostered in Curcio regarding the availability to custodians
of the privilege against self-incrimination to resist providing oral testi-
mony. Allowing the government to compel testimony that is irrele-
vant at the investigative stage, on the theory that the custodian can
never assert the privilege, deprives a witness of the Fifth Amendment
protection at the most important point of the proceeding: the adjudi-
cation of guilt in a public trial. 174
was investigation of other criminal activity); Payden v. United States (In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d
Cir. 1985)(prosecutor may not use grand jury for trial preparation). Abuse of the
grand jury is a strong basis for a court to scrutinize closely the government's
attempt to bypass the privilege against self-incrimination and broadly apply the
Fifth Amendment protection.
173. See generally In re Grand Jury Empaneled on Apr. 6, 1993, 869 F. Supp. 298
(D.N.J. 1994).
174. The approach to the custodian's Fifth Amendment privilege in Curcio and Variety
Distributing is faulty for another reason. The broad language in those cases did
not limit the government's authority to compel testimony only to custodians who
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The fundamental risk posed by Variety Distributing's expansive
analysis is that, by concluding that a custodian can never assert the
privilege against self-incrimination for testimony deemed "auxiliary"
to the production of records, the Sixth Circuit expanded the govern-
ment's opportunity to call a defendant to the witness stand at trial.
Enlarging the category of testimony that falls outside the privilege to
include a key exception to the hearsay rule, the business records ex-
ception, increases the likelihood that prosecutors will look to the de-
fendant to provide such information. Indeed, this already occurred in
Austin-Bagley, when the prosecutor called one of the defendants, a
corporate officer, to testify during the government's case-in-chief
about the authenticity of business documents.17 5
actually produced documents. Instead, the analysis of the custodian's duty to
produce records discussed the general unavailability of the privilege for any cus-
todian which meant that a person who fell within that category could be com-
pelled to provide auxiliary testimony concerning the records. In In re Sealed
Case, 877 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the court of appeals adopted a liberal qualify-
ing test for custodians of records in a collective entity: "[We interpret 'custodian'
to encompass any agent of the corporation who under ordinary principles of cor-
porate law has custody or control over corporate documents." Id. at 86. See also
Henning, White Collar Crime, supra note 41, at 433 ('The determination of who
may be a custodian rejects any formalism, and courts will not confine the
designation of a custodian to the person selected by the entity subpoenaed."). The
government, then, could obtain its auxiliary testimony from the investigative tar-
get while securing the records from another custodian.
The imprecise language concerning a custodian's duty did not condition the
government's authority to compel the testimony to those instances in which it
subpoenaed a particular person, or even that it obtain the records pursuant to a
subpoena duces tecum. Curcio and Variety Distributing can be read to permit the
government to seize records under a search warrant and then demand that a
custodian, who may be the target of the investigation, testify before the grand
jury to provide authentication and business records testimony about the seized
documents. Although quite far afield from where Variety Distributing and Curcio
began their analyses of the custodian's duty to provide testimony, those decisions
sanctioned a broad license to compel oral testimony regardless of how the govern-
ment obtained documents or the incriminating nature of the testimony. It is diffi-
cult to reconcile the language of the Fifth Amendment with this apparent
authority to force testimony from an investigative target simply because of the
person's relationship to a collective entity's records. The Fifth Amendment does
not incorporate any limitation on the privilege according to the label of "custodian
of records".
175. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the trial court can exclude the jury from
hearing testimony by a defendant "when the interests of justice require, or when
an accused is a witness and so requests." FED. R. EvD. 104 (emphasis added).
Moreover, a defendant's testimony on a preliminary matter does not subject the
person to cross-examination on other issues, although the testimony can be used
later in the proceeding for impeachment or as a prior inconsistent statement.
FED. R. EVID. 104(d). The rationale for permitting a defendant to testify about
preliminary issues regarding the admissibility of evidence is to encourage the
exercise of constitutional protections by allowing a defendant to challenge the
government's actions without thereby waiving completely the protections of the
privilege against self-incrimination. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
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The foundation for a prosecutor calling a defendant to testify at
trial is implicit in Curcio's dictum. If the government can compel a
custodian to testify about the authenticity of records because the Fifth
Amendment never applies to such testimony, then the government can
call that custodian to testify at any point in the proceeding, including
the trial. The fact that the custodian is the defendant is irrelevant,
under Curcio's dictum, because the government calls the witness in
the capacity of custodian, in which no Fifth Amendment privilege can
be asserted for oral testimony auxiliary to a prior act of production.
After Braswell, however, the government's calling a defendant as a
witness to authenticate documents violates the evidentiary use limita-
tion applicable at trial when the government compels a custodian to
produce records to a grand jury. Braswell's quasi-constitutional pro-
tection for custodians, however, only prohibits the government from
making direct evidentiary use of the custodian's testimonial acts.1 76
One means by which the government might try to call a defendant as
a witness and still meet the requirements of Braswell's evidentiary
limitation would be to request an instruction to the jury that pros-
cribes the use of the testimony. The instruction would inform the jury
that the defendant's testimony is solely in a representative capacity
for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the rules of evidence,
such as authenticity, and that the jury should not consider it as proof
of the defendant's knowledge or intent in committing the alleged
crime. The instruction arguably preserves the basic protection dis-
cussed in Braswell, that the witness's acts in a representative capacity
cannot be introduced against that person in an individual prosecu-
tion,17 7 while giving the government the benefit of having a defendant
testify, in effect, against himself. Braswell's acknowledgment that the
jury may infer the defendant's knowledge of the content of the records,
and even the underlying transactions, based on the corporate repre-
sentative's production of records, permits indirect use of the defend-
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.12, at 53 (1995)(Rule 104(d) was designed "[mlainly
to permit criminal defendants to invoke protective doctrines without giving up
completely their Fifth Amendment right not to testify."). If the government were
to call a defendant to testify as custodian, concerning the creation and mainte-
nance of the records, it would be incongruous to argue that Rule 104 permits such
testimony because it protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights despite the
compulsion to testify. Unlike the common situation in which a defendant may
challenge governmental action on Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendment grounds in
order to suppress evidence, permitting the government to call a defendant would
allow it to establish its case despite the protections of the Fifth Amendment at
trial. An evidentiary rule that shields a defendant from the prosecutor's power
should not be a surrogate for allowing the government to extend its authority to
compel testimony at the investigative stage to the trial stage.




ant's testimonial acts.1 7 8 Unlike the situation in which the
government grants a witness immunity for a statement, the custo-
dian's act of producing records on behalf of the organization leaves
open the possibility of some use of the representative act in a later
prosecution.
The flaw in this approach is the assumption that the government
can call a defendant to act in a "representative" capacity that is some-
how separate from the prosecution of the individual. The labels ap-
plied to the person representing the corporation at the investigative
stage, that permit compelling the production of records and auxiliary
testimony, are not meaningful at trial when the principal protection of
the privilege against self-incrimination is aimed directly at barring
the government from calling a defendant as a witness against himself.
Limiting instructions are not a substitute for the central meaning of
the Fifth Amendment privilege.179 Even a concession by the govern-
ment that the defendant could testify outside the presence of the jury
would not mitigate the damage from being called as a witness to pro-
vide information to be used for a conviction.
It is doubtful that the courts deciding Curcio or Variety Distribut-
ing had in mind the possibility that the government might call a de-
fendant as a witness during the prosecution's case-in-chief, perhaps
because an intuitive sense of the core protection of the privilege
against self-incrimination makes that scenario seem farfetched. The
defendant's right to remain silent at least during trial appears sacro-
sanct under the language of the Fifth Amendment. Yet, the rhetoric
employed in compelling a custodian to furnish auxiliary testimony op-
erates on the premise that the Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be
asserted because it is not available at the investigative stage of the
proceeding. Therein lies the flaw in the analysis of Variety Distribut-
ing, that once denied the Fifth Amendment protection, the privilege
can never be regained by the custodian. Curcio's principal holding
was that a custodian of records did not waive the protection of the
privilege against self-incrimination by agreeing to represent the col-
lective entity.S 0 The witness' right to assert the privilege, therefore,
should not be denied because a court can attach the formalistic labels
of "custodian of records" to the witness or "auxiliary" to the type of
testimony sought by the government.
178. See id.
179. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232,247 (1957)(Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing)("The fact of the matter [is] that too often such [limiting instructions] against
misuse [are] intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible
declaration cannot be wiped from the brains ofthe jurors. The admonition there-
fore becomes a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protec-
tion to defendants against whom such a declaration should not tell.").
180. See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 123-24 (1957).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Fisher and Braswell, the two most important recent decisions ex-
plaining the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege, are best under-
stood as denying or limiting the privilege only in the investigative
context, when the government's interest in compelling the production
of records is strongest. The Supreme Court's careless use of language
about authentication in Curcio, Fisher, and Braswell, referring to evi-
dentiary issues relevant only in the trial phase, should not obscure the
fact that the restrictive interpretations of a custodian's Fifth Amend-
ment privilege granted the government broad authority to compel tes-
timony or the production of records only before the grand jury and not
to prepare for trial. The Court did not create a system under which a
person can be compelled to provide testimony during the investigative
phase that is only relevant at trial on the ground that such testimony
is never incriminating. Braswell's acknowledgment that a custodian
must be protected from direct evidentiary use of the act of production
in a subsequent criminal prosecution demonstrates that the scope of
the Fifth Amendment privilege is not limited to a single opportunity to
assert the constitutional protection. Fisher and Braswell never re-
jected the custodian's right to assert the privilege in a later prosecu-
tion. This approach to the Fifth Amendment privilege is consistent
with Curcio's primary holding that the custodian did not forego the
full protection of the Fifth Amendment upon assuming the role of rep-
resentative of a collective entity.
The government's authority to compel auxiliary testimony should
be limited to use of that information in the investigative phase of the
case. The potential incrimination from the implicit authentication
conveyed in an act of production is often minimal at that stage of the
proceeding. A witness's status as a custodian should not undermine
automatically the protection available to every person to prevent the
government from forcing testimony that will be used at trial to secure
a conviction. Curcio can be understood within the framework of
Fisher and Braswell that permitted very limited assertions of the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination in the investigative phase of the case
in response to a subpoena for records. Similarly, the Court's dictum in
Curcio, that authentication testimony may be compelled, should only
allow for use of that testimony during the investigation of the case.
If one accepts that Curcio grants the government the authority to
compel auxiliary testimony at any time during a case, then taken to
its logical boundary, the case would empower the prosecution to call a
defendant to testify at trial as its own witness. Curcio cannot be
taken to mean that the government has a license to compel a custo-
dian to authenticate records at any point, including during the trial.
The Fifth Amendment privilege should not be subject to simplistic la-
beling of the witness, as a custodian of records, that would permit the
1998]
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government to vitiate the constitutional protection by compelling tes-
timony at trial to which it is not otherwise entitled.
